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ABSTRACT
In this work is given a picture of how the regulation of financial markets is changed. 
First it was analysed the regulation, the market structure and the requirements for the market 
participants under MIFID I. With this directive trading venue were defined as regulated 
markets, multilateral trading facilities and systematic internalisers. Second it was deeply 
showed with the directive MIFID II how the market functions and its organisation. With MIFID 
II the definition of trading venue changed, now it’s defined as regulated market, multilateral 
trading facility and organised trading facility. At this regard it’s examined the structure and the 
regulation of an Italian trading venue (Mercato Telematico Azionario). At the end it’s given an 
overview of the American regulation alongside with a comparison between the European 
regulation of financial markets and the American one.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of exchange has always been fundamental, from the beginning of the human 
life, when it was mainly based on barter, it was only a way to survive, obtaining what was 
needed, without thinking about getting richer (because the value of the object bartered wasn’t 
recognisable and it wasn’t important). Later the first currencies were introduced (first coins in 
China around 1100 B.C.) to make transactions easier and faster. The paper notes were 
introduced in Europe around the 1600 A.D. even if in Asian countries as China they were used 
since the 600 B.C. 
 Moreover, around the 15th and 16th century in Europe the first stock exchanges started to 
be developed1 (1531 in Belgium and in the 1600’s in the Netherlands, in the UK and in France). 
Then, thanks to the growth of the stock exchange2 it started to be possible to exchange goods 
and assets all over the world, this new scenario changed the concept of exchange into the trade 
one (in the concept of trade the objects doesn’t need to be of the same type differently from the 
exchange).Today we are able to trade also “intangible” assets, financial assets such as stock and 
bonds, using High Frequency Trading3 (HFT) which follows an algorithm to make buy and sell 
operations all over the world in just milliseconds. This new way of doing trading gave a boost 
to the flowing of money allowing us to do business with everyone, everywhere and at any time. 
During the years and the centuries, the governments and the financial experts tried to 
shape the way to do exchange. To do so, they set rules, laws, regulations and directives with 
different aims: 
• Try to avoid as much as possible the exchange of assets on the non-regulated market. 
• Through the first point, they wanted to earn money with fees received from the operators 
in the regulated markets. 
• Give protection to the clients of these markets. 
Moreover, these directives and rules set by the regulators of the markets has been affected 
by continuous changes. Before the establishment of European Union and the settlement of 
common laws about international exchanges, every country was deciding and following their 
                                                          
1 Fohlin, C. (2016). Frictions: Lessons from the History of Financial Market Microstructure. In: D. 
Chambers and E. Dimson, ed., FINANCIAL MARKET HISTORY REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST FOR 
INVESTORS TODAY. David Chambers and Elroy Dimson, pp.134-147. 
2 Neal, L. (2016). Frictions: The role of Stock Exchanges in Financial Globalization: A Historical 
Perspective. In: D. Chambers and E. Dimson, ed., FINANCIAL MARKET HISTORY REFLECTIONS ON 
THE PAST FOR INVESTORS TODAY. David Chambers and Elroy Dimson, pp. 118-130   
3 Durbin, M. (2010). All About High Frequency Trading. The McGraw-Hill companies. 
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own ones. Focusing our attention on the Italian scenario, in the early ’90 it was introduced the 
so called “obbligo di concentrazione” (concentration rule), which was settled by the law4 
2.1.1991 n. 15. Through this law the intermediaries were forced to trade financial assets, 
exclusively on the official and regulated markets, where they were quoted6. The regulators 
decided to settle this law because the Italian financial market was characterized by permanent 
liquidity issues. This obligation was supposed to increase the exchanges on the regulated market 
giving a boost to the transparency on it, as well as protecting the weak side of the market. 
On the other side, the Council of the European Communities with the Directive 93/22/CE7 
was moving to the liberalisation of the trades Over the Counter (OTC), following an Anglo-
Saxon mindset, leaving more responsibilities and duties to the Member States regulators. This 
liberalisation of the trades was possible thanks to the Home country control principle art. 14 
Dir. 93/22/CE. The Consob was considering the “obbligo di concentrazione” a fundamental 
guarantee for the liquidity of the market, so it decided with the Dir. 23 July 1996 n. 415 to re-
introduce the concentration rule. 
This obligation has some waivers: 
• Best execution8, when the investor previously authorizes the trades over the counter 
allowing him to have a better price. 
• Block trading, when the countervalue of the assets are equal or higher than the one 
established for the blocks. 
• Spezzatura9, when the total amount of assets doesn’t reach the minimum value to be 
traded on the regulated market so they to be exchanged on the OTC to satisfy the small 
investors’ needs. 
The concentration rule was considered obsolete after the development of the so-called 
Electronic Communication Networks (ECN) and the Alternative/Automated Trading Systems 
(ATS)10. These mechanisms of trading were born to fulfil a liquidity and transparency need, 
while in the European union, they are characterized by the so-called trading after hours and by 
a continuous auction market. 
                                                          
4 User, S. (2018). CONCENTRAZIONE DEGLI SCAMBI. 
5 Article abrogated by Article 66 Law 23/7/1996 n.415 
6 Law 2.1.1991 n.1 
7 Marin, F. (2018). VERSO LA CAPITAL MARKETS UNION: LE NUOVE TRADING VENUE NELLA MIFID 
II E NEL MIFIR. RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITTO DELL’ECONOMIA, (1), 63-93. 
8 Faustini, E. (2008). L’eliminazione dell’obbligo di concentrazione nella Direttiva Mifid. Luiss Carlo Guidi. 
 9 User, S. (2018). CONCENTRAZIONE DEGLI SCAMBI 
10 Faustini, E. (2008). L’eliminazione dell’obbligo di concentrazione nella direttiva Mifid. Ed. Luiss Guido Carli. 
3 
 
Thanks to the Dir. 93/22/EEC11 more investors became more interested and active in doing 
business in the financial markets, to them were offered an even more complex and wide range 
of services. To trade more complex assets, it was required a higher level of protection and 
transparency to have a fair and a successful transaction on the regulated market. The European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union at this point decided that it was time to 
replace the Dir. 93/22/EEC with a new one. This Directive was the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive which brought some changes that will be analysed later. 
  
                                                          
11 Marin, F. (2018). VERSO LA CAPITAL MARKETS UNION: LE NUOVE TRADING VENUE NELLA 
MIFID II E NEL MIFIR. RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITTO DELL’ECONOMIA pag 67 
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2. MIFID I 
The new Directive was the 2004/39/EC, commonly known as Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MIFID I), wanted to build a level playing field12 between the European 
Union and the financial intermediaries. MIFID I is based on the Lamfalussy method, approved 
by the European Council in 2001. This method shows four13 different levels of regulations and 
MIFID I is the first one which is followed by the Directive 2006/73/CE and the Regulation 
1287/2006/CE. The Directive 2004/39/EC was referred to three macro categories14. The first 
one includes the intermediaries (banks and investment firms). The second category is formed 
by the so-called Trading Venues. These trading venues are divided in three sub-categories the 
regulated markets, the Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTF) and the Systematic Internaliser 
(SI) (MTF and SI are introduced by MIFID I). The last category is composed from the financial 
consultation providers.  
With the introduction of the MIFID I new needs came out. The regulators recognised that 
it’s appropriate to include in the list some financial instruments and some derivatives which are 
traded and constituted in a way to rise regulatory issues comparable to traditional financial 
instruments. It became necessary to establish15 a regime governing the execution of transaction 
in financial instruments, irrespective of the trading methods used to conclude those transaction, 
to ensure a high-quality execution of investors’ transactions. A coherent and risk-sensitive 
framework to regulate the order-execution arrangement active in the European financial market 
should be provided.  
With the quick expansion and development of the financial market the European parliament 
and Council understood the necessity of a new generation of organised trading systems16 
alongside regulated markets which should be subjected to obligations designed to preserve the 
efficiency and the order of financial markets. These new systems got the name of Multilateral 
Trading Facility (MTF) and Systematic Internaliser (SI) defined at art.4. (15). and at art.4. (7) 
of the Directive 2004/39/EC. The definition should exclude bilateral17 systems where an 
investment firm enters into every trade on own account without being a riskless counterparty 
between the buyer and seller.  
                                                          
12 Faustini, E. (2008). L’eliminazione dell’obbligo di concentrazione nella direttiva Mifid. Ed. Luiss Guido Carli. 
13 European Council Stockholm, Conclusions of the Presidency. (2001). [Ebook]. 
14 Directive 2004/39/EC (2004). 
15 Faustini, E. (2008). L’eliminazione dell’obbligo di concentrazione nella direttiva Mifid. Ed. Luiss Guido Carli. 
16 Marin, F. (2018). VERSO LA CAPITAL MARKETS UNION: LE NUOVE TRADING VENUE NELLA 
MIFID II E NEL MIFIR. RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITTO DELL’ECONOMIA 
17 Directive 2004/39/EC (6) 
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This Directive is not referred to every person. The references to persons should be 
understood as including both natural and legal ones. 
The people who are not covered by the scope of this Directive are18: 
• People that manage their assets and undertakings, who just deal on own account unless 
they’re market makers or they do it outside a regulated market or an MTF on an organised, 
frequent and systemic basis. 
• People who don’t provide services for third parties but whose business consists in 
providing investment services only for their parent undertakings, subsidiaries. 
• People who provide investment services only on an incidental basis during the 
professional activity. 
•  People who provide investment services consisting exclusively in the administration of 
employee-participation schemes and who therefore do not provide investment services for third 
parties. 
• Central banks and other bodies performing similar functions as well as public bodies 
charged with or intervening in the management of the public debt. 
• Collective investment undertakings and pension funds coordinated or not at Community 
level. The managers of such undertakings being subject to specific rules directly adapted to 
their activities. 
There are some exceptions where someone from the above list starts to be covered by this 
Directive. This can happen when a person19 makes investment services and activities that were 
ancillary to his main business then they became its main one. 
On the other side the person who are covered by this Directive20, providing and performing 
investment services and activities, should be subjected to authorisation by their home Member 
States to protect investors and the stability of the financial system. In this case an investment 
firm authorised in its home Member State is able to provide or perform investment services and 
activities across the Community without the need of a separate authorisation from the Member 
State in which it wishes to do these services and activities. While credit institutions authorised 
with the Directive 2000/12/EC21 shouldn’t need other authorisations. This Directive abolished 
                                                          
18 Directive 2004/39/EC (2004). 
19 Recital 8 Directive 2004/39/EC  
20 Recital 7 Directive 2004/39/EC  
21 Article 4 Title III Directive 2000/12/EC 
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the concentration rule22, for a more free and competitive financial market. This enhanced the 
possibility of conflict of interest between different investment firms. For this reason, also, the 
services should be provided at the initiative of the client. 
MIFID I was introduced to solve some problems, to do that it settled some rules. The aims 
of the Directive 2004/39/EC are23: 
• Stronger Investor protection. 
• Markets’ integrity. 
• More robust and efficient market structure. 
• Increase supervisory powers and set a stricter framework for commodity derivatives 
markets. 
• Taking into account the technological innovations. 
Stronger investor protection: one of the goals of this Directive is the protection of the 
investors. There are different measures of protection, these should be adapted to the 
characteristics of each category on investors (retail, professional and counterparties). The 
investors’ characteristics are obtained with the so-called MIFID questionnaire24. Through this 
document the market operators, as banks, are able to know their clients in a deeper way. To the 
clients is asked: 
• Their level of education.  
• If they have been employed in the last 5 years in a position requiring financial ability 
and knowledge. 
• If they know risk and characteristics of the product (government bonds, corporate bonds 
and shares). 
• Which is their trading experience. 
• The number of transactions they have done is the past 3 years. 
With this information the market operator will be able to create a different investment 
project for every client. This project will be based on the information obtained through the 
questionnaire.  
                                                          
22 Orsi, G. (2018). L'Abolizione della Concentration Rule e la Competizione tra le Nuove Sedi di Esecuzione 
23 European Commission (2011). Review of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive. Bruxelles. 
24 Zavaritt, A. (2007). Mifid, il questionario che le banche devono ancora fare. Il Sole 24 Ore. 
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The personal data of the investors, obtained by the market operators, has to be protected in 
accordance with the Directive 95/46/EC25 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
To safeguard the traders on the regulated market, MTF and SI it’s necessary to impose the 
“best execution”26 obligation to ensure that the orders are executed in the most favourable way 
for the client27. The increase of competition and the possibility to have an unfair playing field 
pushes the regulators to allow to the markets participants and investors to compare the prices 
that trading venues28 (regulated market, MTF and SI) are forced to publish.  
A way to get closer to reach this objective is to ensure that transparency of transaction is 
achieved and that the rules are applied to investment firms when they operate on the markets29. 
In order to enable investors to assess at any time the terms of a transaction. Common rules 
should be established for the publication of completed transactions in shares and for the 
disclosure of current opportunities to trade in shares. These rules are needed to promote the 
efficiency of the overall price formation process for equity instruments and to assist the 
effective operation of “best execution” obligations. 
An investment firm is obliged to quote a bid and offer price and to execute an order at the 
quoted price. This doesn’t relieve the investment firm from the obligation to route to a different 
execution venue an order when such internalisation can prevent the firm from complying with 
the “best execution” obligations30.In fact, a Member State could decide to apply the pre and 
post-trade transparency requirements written in this Directive to financial instruments. These 
requirements are different for the MTFs31and the regulated markets32. 
In that case those requirements should apply to all investment firms for which this Member 
State is the Home Member State for their operations within the territory of that Member State 
and those done cross-border thanks to the liberalisation of the transactions33. 
 
                                                          
25 Recital 30 Directive 95/46/EC Article 1 of the same directive 
26 Article 21 Directive 2004/39/EC 
27 It follows the principle settle by the article 19 (1) Directive 2004/39/EC “when providing investment services an 
investment firm must act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of its clients”. 
28 Recital 34 Directive 2004/39/EC  
29 Marin, F. (2018). VERSO LA CAPITAL MARKETS UNION: LE NUOVE TRADING VENUE NELLA 
MIFID II E NEL MIFIR. RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITTO DELL’ECONOMIA 
30 Recital 44 Directive 2004/39/EC. 
31Article 29 and 30 Directive 2004/39/EC (2004). 
32 Article 44 and 45 Directive 2004/39/EC (2004) 
33 Recital 48 Directive 2004/39/EC 
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More robust and efficient market structure: one of the main aims of this directive was 
increase the competition into the financial markets34. To do so the directive MIFID I keep 
abolished the concentration rule and introduce two new generations of organised trading 
systems alongside regulated markets which should be subjected to obligations designed to 
preserve the efficient and orderly functioning of financial markets. These two new trading 
systems are Multilateral Trading Facility (MTF) and Systematic Internaliser (SI) and with the 
regulated markets composed the so-called Trading Venues35. 
 
2.1. Regulated Markets 
The first components of the trading venues are the regulated markets. These were defined 
and regulated before MIFID I by the Directive 93/22/EEC.  
Regulated market36 is defined by the article 1.13 of Directive 93/22/EC (ISD). This market 
has to be identified as a regulated market from the home Member State, it has to be recognized 
as a regularly functioning market. A key role into the definition of regulated market is played 
by the competent authorities, they have to point out the requirements for the operation of the 
market, they have to settle the conditions to be admitted to the market, then they need to decide 
where the admission to official listing is possible (Directive 79/279/EEC). Moreover, they need 
                                                          
34 Marin, F. (2018). VERSO LA CAPITAL MARKETS UNION: LE NUOVE TRADING VENUE NELLA 
MIFID II E NEL MIFIR. RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITTO DELL’ECONOMIA 
35Recital 34 Directive 2004/39/EC 
36 Article 1(13) Council Directive 93/22/EEC to have the legislator definition 
Figure 1Trading venues scheme 
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to fix the conditions that must be respected by a financial instrument before it can be traded on 
the market. The last characteristic of regulated market according to ISD is that, it has to satisfy 
the transparency requirements and it has to report all the information needed to the competent 
authorities. These requirements are written on the article 20 and 21 of the ISD  
Each Member State is forced to have an updated list of regulated markets authorised by it 
as Art.16 of Directive 93/22/EEC37 said. This information has to be communicated to other 
Member States and the Commission. The commission is required to publish a list of regulated 
markets notified to it on a yearly basis.  
With the introduction of the Directive 2004/39/EC38 the definition and the regulations of 
the regulated markets changed. They are defined at Art.4 (14) “Regulated market means a 
multilateral system operated and/or managed by a market operator, which brings together or 
facilitates the bringing together of multiple third-party buying and selling interests in financial 
instruments – in the system and in accordance with its nondiscretionary rules – in a way that 
results in a contract, in respect of the financial instruments admitted to trading under its rules 
and/or systems, and which is authorised and functions regularly and in accordance with 
provisions of Title III.” 
Obviously to operate a regulated market the activities need to be authorised. This 
authorisation39 regards all activities that are directly related to the display, processing, 
execution, confirmation and reporting of orders from the point at which these orders are 
received by the regulated market (RM) to the point where they’re transmitted for subsequent 
finalisation and to activities related to the admission of financial instruments of trading. 
To obtain this authorisation a regulated market needs at first to satisfy some capital 
requirements40. It should consider the specific nature of the risks associated with such markets. 
The competent authority is satisfied when both the system of the regulated market and the 
market operator comply with the requirements of Title III of MIFID I41.When a regulated 
market is a legal person managed or operated by a market operator instead of the regulated 
market itself the Member States should decide how to differentiate the obligations between the 
regulated market and the market operator42. To follow the principle of the transparency the 
                                                          
37 Article 16 Council Directive 93/22/EEC 
38 Article 4(14) title I Directive 2004/39/EC 
39Recital 49 Directive 2004/39/EC 
40Council Directive 93/6/EEC of 15th March 1993 
41 Article 36 Directive 2004/39/EC 
42 Article 36(1) Directive 2004/39/EC 
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regulated market’s operator has to provide all the information and the organisational structure 
to the competent authority to show that it has established all the necessary arrangements to meet 
its obligations. Moreover, the Member States require from the operator of regulated markets to 
perform tasks relating to the organisation and operation of it under the supervision of the 
competent authority. The regulated market has to be controlled by the competent authorities43. 
A surveillance role is played by the Member States, they shall ensure that market operator 
is responsible for the regulated market that he manages, and he is entitled to exercise the rights 
that correspond to the regulated market44. 
In some cases, the authorisation can be withdrawn by the competent authority if45:  
• The regulated market doesn’t use the authorisation within twelve months, it 
hasn’t operated it in the last six months, it expressly renounces to the authorisation.  
• To obtain the authorisation the regulated market has made false statements or by 
any other irregular means. 
• The conditions under which the authorisation was given are no longer meet by 
the regulated market. 
• The regulated market has seriously infringed the disposition adopted pursuant to 
this Directive. 
• Regulated market falls in any cases where the withdrawal of the authorisation is 
provided by the national law. 
The entity that conducts the business and the operations of the regulated market needs to 
have a sufficiently good reputation. It also needs to be sufficiently experienced to ensure the 
sound, the safe management and the operations of the regulated market46. In accordance with 
the transparency rule the identity and any subsequent changes of the persons who direct the 
business has to be notified to the competent authority. The Directive 2004/39/EC pointed out 
the requirements not only, as above, for the persons who manages the regulated market but also 
for the ones that are able to exercise a significant influence over the management of the RM47. 
                                                          
43 Article 36(2) Directive 2004/39/EC 
44 Article 36(3) Directive 2004/39/EC 
45 Article 36(5) Directive 2004/39/EC  
46 Article 37(1) Directive 2004/39/EC 
47 Article 37(2) Directive 2004/39/EC 
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The people48 who can exercise, directly or indirectly, a significant influence over the 
management of the regulated market need to be suitable. The operator of the market has to 
provide to the competent authority the whole information about the persons able to exercise 
significant influence over the management (ownership of the regulated market, the identity and 
the scale of interests of any parties)49. The competent authority needs to be public informed of 
any transfer of ownership which lead to a change in the identity of the persons influencing the 
operation of the regulated market. The authorities above mentioned have the power and the 
right to refuse or to approve the proposed changes to the controlling interest of the regulated 
market. A proposal of changes can be refused if there are objects and grounds for believing that 
they would cause a threat to the management of the regulated market50. A regulated market is 
asked by Member States to have arrangements to clearly identify and manage the possible 
adverse consequences due to its operations and its participants and in case of any conflict of 
interests, in other words it needs to be resilient. The regulated market needs to manage the risk 
to which it’s exposed, to identify these risks and to develop effective measures to mitigate those 
risks51. 
Not all financial instruments can be traded on regulated markets. They need to be admitted 
to trading. The first step of these procedure has to be made by the regulated markets which is 
asked to have and to keep clear and transparent rules concerning the admission of financial 
instruments to trading52. These rules ensure that whole the financial instruments admitted to 
trading in a regulated market can be traded in a fair, orderly and efficient manner and are freely 
negotiable in the case of transferable securities. The issuer of the transferable securities 
admitted to trading on the regulated market should comply with their obligations under 
Community law about initial, ongoing or ad hoc disclosure obligations53. A transferable 
security can be admitted to trading to multiple regulated markets, it can be subsequently 
admitted to trading on other regulated markets even without the consent of the issuer and in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of Directive 2003/71/EC54. If an issuer’s securities have 
been admitted to trading without its consent, he is not obliged to provide information. In case 
of derivatives, the rules set the design of the derivative contract for its orderly pricing as well 
as for the existence of effective settlement conditions. 
                                                          
48 Article 38(1) Directive 2004/39/EC 
49 Article 38(2)(a) Directive 2004/39/EC 
50 Article 38(3) Directive 2004/39/EC 
51 Article 39(a) and 39(b) Directive 2004/39/EC  
52 Article 40(1) Directive 2004/39/EC 
53 Article 40(3) Directive 2004/39/EC 
54 Article 40(5) Directive 2004/39/EC 
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In order to have an equal and uniform application of the admission requirements to trading 
the Commission55 should implement measures that: 
• Specify the characteristics of different classes of instruments that a regulated 
market needs to take into account when assessing if an instrument is issued in accordance 
with the conditions for admission to trading on different market segments. 
• Clarify the arrangements that the regulated market has to settle to facilitate its 
participants or members to obtain the access to information published under the 
Community law’s conditions. 
The operator (manager) of the regulated market can suspend or remove a financial 
instrument from trading, that no complies anymore with the rules of it, only if the suspension 
or the removal from trading of it will not cause significant damage to the investors’ interests or 
the orderly functioning of the market56. Differently from the operator of the regulated market a 
competent authority can only demand the suspension or the removal. Regulated market’s 
operator who suspends or removes financial instrument from trading has to make public his 
decision and communicates it to the competent authority57.  
The competent authority shall inform the other Member States’ competent authority. The 
regulated market is required to establish and maintain transparent and non-discriminatory rules 
while managing the access to or membership of the regulated market. Those rules58 set 
obligations for members or participants arising from: 
• Rules linked to transactions on the market. 
• Procedures and rules for the settlement and the clearing of transactions 
concluded on the regulated market. 
• Professional standards on the investment firms’ or credit institutions’ staff that 
are operating on the market. 
• The constitution and administration of the regulated market. 
To be a participant or a member of regulated markets investment firms and credit 
institutions need to fulfil the requirements settle by the directive 2000/12/EC Title II59. The 
admission and the participation to the regulated market are not only allowed to investment firms 
                                                          
55 Article 40(6) and 64(2) Directive 2004/39/EC 
56 Article 41(1) Directive 2004/39/EC 
57 Article 41(2) Directive 2004/39/EC 
58 Article 42(2) Directive 2004/39/EC 
59 Article 5 and 9 Directive 2000/12/EC 
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and credit institutions. Persons who have enough level of trading experience, who are fit and 
proper, who have adequate organisational arrangements, who have sufficient resources for the 
role they are to perform, considering the different financial arrangements that the regulate 
market may have established in order to guarantee the adequate settlement of transactions60. 
Regulated markets from other Member States should be allowed by their Member State to 
provide arrangements on their territory to make the access easier and the trading on those 
markets by participants in their territory. Obviously, the Regulated market has to report to the 
competent authority of its Member State where it is intended to provide these arrangements61.  
Regulated markets have to maintain effective arrangements and procedures to monitor the 
compliance by their members with their rules. Regulated markets62 shall also control the 
transactions done by their members or participants in order to find breaches on the rules. When 
a breach of the rules or disorderly trading conditions are founded they have to be reported to 
the competent authority of the regulated market63. The operator of the regulated market is 
required to notify the information on time to the authority for the investigation and prosecution 
of market abuse and to aid in investigating and prosecuting market abuse occurred on or through 
the system of the regulated market.    
To respect one of the main points of the Directive 2004/39/EC the regulated markets need 
to respect pre and post-trade requirements. Before the trade the regulated markets have to 
publish on a continuous basis, during the trading hours, the current bid and offer prices and the 
depth of trading interests at those prices that are advertised through their systems for shares 
admitted to trading. The competent authority can waive the obligation for regulated markets to 
publish the information on the market model or the type and size of orders64. To provide a fair 
respect of these pre-trade rules the Commission should implement measures about the range of 
bid and offers prices or about the designed market-maker quotes, the depth of trading interest 
at those prices, to be made public. The size or type of orders and the market model for which 
pre-trade disclosure may be waived have to be enhanced65. 
Regulated markets have to publish post-trade, as they do pre-trade, the price, the time and 
the volume of the transactions executed of shares admitted to trading. Those transactions have 
to be published as close to time as possible and on a reasonable commercial basis. Competent 
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authorities can enable the deferred publication of transactions that are larger in scale compared 
to the normal size for that share or class of shares. Each Member State must draw up a list of 
regulated markets for which it’s the home Member State and submit it to the other Member 
States and to the Commission66. If the list is changed a similar communication is required. The 
Commission has to publish the list on the Official Journal of the European Union and on its 
website and update it at least once a year. 
2.2 Multilateral Trading Facility (MTF) 
With the abolition of the concentration rule67 with the Directive 2004/39/EC we saw a boost 
of the competition on the national and community markets. For this reason, the European 
parliament and the Council decide to recognise and institutionalize new systems of trading, one 
of these are the Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTF). The MTF are defined at the Art.4 (15) 
of the Directive 2004/39/EC “Multilateral trading facility (MTF) means a multilateral system, 
operated by an investment firm or a market operator, which brings together multiple third-
party buying and selling interests in financial instruments – in the system and in accordance 
with non-discretionary rules – in a way that results in a contract in accordance with the 
provision of Title II”. 
MIFID I underlines that the MTFs’ function is more or less the same as the regulated 
markets’ one68. We understand it because the definition of regulated market is similar to the 
one of MTFs’. These first two components of the trading venues are both multilateral systems, 
they are both subjected to authorisations, they both follow non-discretionary rules and they 
follow the same transparency rules. After the definition of the MTF we find also some 
differences between regulated market and MTFs. In the regulated markets are traded only 
“regulated” financial instruments while into the MTF it is possible to trade also non-regulated 
ones69. The main difference between these two branches of trading venues is that the MTF can 
be operated by market operator and investment firms while the regulated markets only by 
market operator70. 
Same as the regulated market also on the MTF the performance of investment activities or 
services on a professional basis should be previously authorised but the home Member State. It 
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shall also allow any market operator to operate an MTF subject to verification of their 
compliance71. All the investment firms have to be reported in a public accessible register, it has 
to contain information on the activities and services for which the investment firm is authorised. 
This register has to be updated on a regular basis72.  
Any investment firm, which is a legal person, is required by its home Member State to have 
its head quarter in the same Member State of its registered office. On the other hand, any 
investment firm, that is not a legal person or it is a legal person but under its national law, that 
has no registered office it will have its head office in the Member State in which it carries on 
its business73. An investment firm has to set policies and procedures to ensure compliance of 
the firm including its managers, employees and tied agents. It should maintain and operate 
effective organisational and administrative arrangements, it needs to ensure continuity and 
regularity in the performance of investment services and activities. For this purpose, the 
investment firm should employ proportionate and appropriate systems, procedures and 
resources74. To avoid undue additional operational risk an investment firm, when it relies on a 
third party for performance of operational functions that are critical for the provision of 
continuous and satisfactory service to clients and the performance of investment activities, has 
to take reasonable steps75. 
The competent authority to monitor the investment firms’ compliance to the Directive 
2004/39/EC asks to them to arrange records of all transaction and services undertaken by it. To 
follow one of the main aims of the MIFID I, clients’ protection, an investment firm, when holds 
clients’ financial instruments, must make proper arrangements especially in the event of the 
investment firms’ insolvency. These arrangements are useful to prevent the use of a client’s 
instruments on own account without the client’s express consent76. Investment firms have to 
make adequate arrangements also when they hold clients’ funds even in this case to safeguard 
the clients’ rights and, except in the case of credit institutions, prevent the use of client funds 
for its own account. 
Market operators and investment firms operating an MTF shall establish transparent and 
non-discretionary rules and procedures, to have fair and orderly trading. They are required from 
the Member State to establish objective criteria for efficient execution orders. The Member 
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States require also to the investments firms or market operators, operating an MTF, to settle 
rules about the criteria to determine the financial instruments which can be traded under its 
system. The operators of an MTF must provide enough information to enable its users to make 
their own investment judgement77. 
To respect the more transparent orientation of the European Union and Council the 
manager78 of an MTF should establish and maintain transparent rules governing access to its 
facility. The users of an MTF need to be informed about investment firms’ or market operators’ 
responsibilities for the settlement of the transactions executed in that facility. When a 
transferable security, which is admitted to trading on a regulated market, is also traded on an 
MTF without the authorization of the issuer, the issuer should not be subject to any obligation 
to that MTF79. 
The competent authority, with the appropriate measures in place, should be able to monitor 
the activities of investment firms to guarantee that they act honestly, fairly and professionally 
and in a way to promote the integrity of the market80. The data relating to all transactions in 
financial instruments which the investment firms have carried, whether on own account or on 
behalf of a client, have to be kept at disposal of the competent authority for at least five years. 
If the transactions are carried on behalf of the client, the records shall contain the identity, all 
the information, the details of clients and the information required by the Directive 
91/308/EEC81 about the prevention of the use of financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering. 
Investment firms, that run transactions in any financial instruments admitted to trading on 
a regulated market, have to report details of the transactions to the competent authorities as 
soon as possible. This obligation is applied whether the transactions were carried out on a 
regulated market82. The information obtained by the competent authorities shall be received by 
the competent authorities of the most relevant market in terms of liquidity for those financial 
instruments. The reports containing the information shall include names and numbers of the 
instruments bought or sold, the dates, the times of execution, the quantity, the prices and means 
of identifying the investment firms concerned83. 
                                                          
77 Article 14(1), Article 14(2) and Article 14(3) Directive 2004/39/EC 
78 Article 14(4) Directive 2004/39/EC should comply with the conditions in the Article 42(3) 
79 Article 14(5) and Article 14(6) Directive 2004/39/EC 
80 Article 16(2) and Article 25(1) Directive 2004/39/EC 
81 Article 25(2) Directive 2004/39/EC linked with Article I and 2 Directive 91/308/EEC 
82 Article 25(3) Directive 2004/39/EC 
83 Section 3 Article 25(4) Directive 2004/39/EC 
17 
 
Member States require that investment firms and market operators operating an MTF 
establish and maintain effectively procedures and arrangements, relevant to the MTF, to 
monitor the compliance by its users with its rules. The transactions undertaken by the MTF 
users must be monitored by the investment firms and market operators operating such MTF. 
This monitoring is needed in order to identify breaches of the rules, disorderly trading 
conditions or conduct that may involve market abuse84. 
In the case of significant breaches of the rules or disorderly trading condition the market 
operators and the investment firms have to report them. They are also required from the Member 
State to give information without delay to the authority competent for the investigation and 
prosecution of market abuse and to provide also full assistance in investigating and prosecuting 
market abuse occurring on or through its system85. 
Investment firms which, either on own account or on behalf of clients, conclude transaction 
in shares admitted to trading outside an MTF, have to publish the volume, the price and the 
time of such transactions. These information shall be published as close to real-time as possible 
in a way easily accessible to other market participants86. Article 29 and article 30 of the 
Directive 2004/39/EC settle pre and post-trade transparency rules which are the same as the 
ones for the regulated markets. The difference is that the pre and post-trade transparency rules 
for MTFs have to respected not only by market operators but also from investment firms. 
2.3 Systematic Internaliser (SI) 
The third and last component of the Trading Venues under MIFID I are the systematic 
internalisers that operate only on a bilateral basis. 
Systematic internalisers are defined at the Art. 4(1)(7) of the Directive 2004/39/EC as 
“Systematic internaliser means an investment firm which, on an organised, frequent and 
systematic basis, deals on own account by executing client orders outside a regulated market 
or an MTF”  
Thanks to the Regulation 1287/2006 we identify the criteria for determining when an 
investment firm is a systematic internaliser87. The article 21 section 2 of this regulation affirms 
that when an investment firm deals on own account by executing clients’ orders outside a 
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regulated market or an MTF it must be treated as a systematic internaliser if it follows and 
respects some criteria showing that it performs an activity on an organised, frequent and 
systematic basis88: 
• The activity has a commercial role for the firm, it’s carried according with non-
discretionary rules and procedures; 
• The activity is carried on by personnel, or by means of an automated technical 
system, assigned to that aim, without caring if those personnel or that system are used 
exclusively for that purpose; 
• The activity is available to clients on a regular or a continuous basis. 
If an investment firm doesn’t carry on the activity specified above in respect of one or more 
shares it ceases to be a systematic internaliser in those shares89. The investment firm has to 
announce in advance its intention to cease that activity using the same channels as it uses to 
publish its quotes if it’s not possible using a channel that is identically accessible to its clients 
and other market participants. 
The activity of dealing on own account executing client orders in some cases shall not be 
treated as performed on an organised, frequent and systematic basis: 
• The activity is performed on an ad hoc and non-regular bilateral basis with the 
wholesale counterparties as part of the business relation which are characterised by dealing 
above standard market size; 
• The transactions are carried outside the system usually used by the firm 
concerned for any business that it carries in the capacity of a systematic internaliser. 
The competent authority shall make certain the maintenance and publication of a list of all 
systematic internaliser (S.I), in respect of the shares admitted to trading on a regulated market, 
which has to be authorised as investment firm. This list has to be reviewed at least annually90. 
An investment firm will constitute a systematic internaliser where it’s proposing to execute 
a client order. Systematic internaliser can decide to give access to their quotes only to 
professional clients, only to retail clients, or to both. They shouldn’t be able to discriminate 
with those categories of clients. 
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The Member States require systematic internalisers in shares to publish a firm quote in the 
shares admitted to trading on a regulated market for which they are systematic internalisers and 
for that there is a liquid market. These shares91 are considered to have a liquid market if the 
they are traded daily with a free float at least of EUR 500 million and not less than one of these 
conditions is satisfied: 
• The average number of transactions in the share per day is not less than 500; 
• The daily average turnover for the shares is at least EUR 2 million. 
 A share is not considered to have a liquid market if the estimate of the total market 
capitalisation for that share the first day of trading after the admission is less than EUR 500 
million. 
For each liquid share that a systematic internaliser is considered as it, this S.I should 
maintain quotes that are close in price to comparable quotes for the same share in other trading 
venues. Furthermore, it has to maintain a record of its quoted prices, which it shall retain for at 
least 12 months or more if it’s considered appropriate. If there is not a liquid market for those 
shares, systematic internalisers shall disclosure quotes to their clients on request92. 
 In the article 27 of MIFID I the European parliament and council make a distinction 
between systematic internalisers that only deal in sizes above standard market size, which are 
not subject to the provisions of this article, and the ones who sometimes deal for sizes up to 
standard market size and in this case are subject to the provisions of this article. Systematic 
internalisers are authorized to decide the size or sizes at which they are going to quote. For a 
specific share each quote can include firm’s bid and/or offer prices for sizes which could be up 
to standard market size for the class of shares to which the share belongs. These prices shall 
reflect the market conditions for that share. These shares are grouped in classes based on the 
average value of the orders executed in the market for those shares. These classes are defined, 
at least annually, by the competent authority of the most relevant market in terms of liquidity. 
This information has to be made public to all market participants93. The systematic internalisers’ 
quotes have to be published on a regular and continuous basis during trading hours. They need 
to be updated at any time and they can be withdrawn under exceptional market conditions. 
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They have to be published in an easy and accessible way for the other market participants 
on a reasonable commercial basis94. 
Systematic internaliser execute the orders they receive from their retail clients in relation 
to the shares for which they are systematic internaliser at the quoted prices at the time of the 
reception of the order. The number and the volume of orders has to be considered as exceeding 
the norm if a systematic internaliser cannot execute these orders without having undue risks. 
To find the orders’ number and volume that can execute without undue risk a systematic 
internaliser shall maintain and implement as part of its risk management policy a non-
discriminatory one that considers the volume of transactions, the capital that the firm has to 
cover the risk for that kind of trade and the prevailing conditions in the market in which the 
firm is operating. These orders have to be executed while complying with the obligations to 
execute orders on terms most favourable to the client95. 
For this purpose, the investment firms, authorized to trade, must execute their orders 
without missing any passage. The point to be considered are the price, the costs, the speed, the 
orders’ chance to be executed and settled, the size, the nature and any other detail that can 
influence the execution of the order.  Systematic internalisers can execute orders received from 
their professional clients at different prices than their quoted ones without having to comply 
with the rules, in respect of a transaction or orders that are subjected to conditions other than 
the current market price. A systematic internaliser, whose quote or higher quote is lower than 
the standard market size, receives an order from a client of a bigger size than its quotation size 
(lower than the standard market size) it can decide to execute the part of the order that exceed 
its quotation size, providing the execution at the quoted price96. 
Systematic internalisers decide, basing on their commercial policy and in an objective and 
non-discriminatory way, the investors to whom they give access to their quotes. They can refuse 
to start discontinuing or not business relationships with investors on the basis of commercial 
considerations (investors’ credit status, the counterparty risk and the final settlement of the 
transaction). Systematic internalisers can limit the risk of being exposed to multiple transactions 
from the same client restricting in a non-discriminatory way the number of transactions from 
the same client. They can limit in a non-discriminatory way the total number of transactions 
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from different clients at the same time only where the number or/and volume of orders sought 
by clients exceeds considerably the norm97.  
Same as the other two components of the trading venues the systematic internalisers have 
to publish pre-trade information on a continuous basis during the trading hours. The pre and 
post-trading information linked with the transactions, taking place on trading venues and during 
the normal trading hours, shall be available as close as possible to the real time. The post-trade 
information has to be made available in any case within three minutes of the relevant 
transaction. In the case of transactions that take place on a trading venue outside the trading 
hours the post-trade information has to be made public before the opening of the next trading 
day of the trading venue where the transaction was made98. 
2.4 Over The Counter (OTC)  
Not all the financial instruments are traded on the trading venues, if one of them is traded 
outside the exchange we can say that it’s traded on the Over The Counter (OTC). An OTC 
market has some characteristics: high level of customisation this means that the financial 
products are made basing on the willingness of clients, lack of transparency because the price 
of a transaction is made public only after that the transaction is over and lack of regulation 
because on these markets the counterparties trade with another one without having 
intermediaries. 
In over the counter markets, an investor who wants to sell or to buy have to look for a 
counterparty. Therefore, when two counterparties meet, their relationship is only strategic. 
Prices are set with a bargaining process that represents each investors’ or market-makers’ 
alternatives to immediate trade99. The advantage of the OTC market is that a transaction can be 
tailored to meet the precise needs of the end-user. Even if the OTC derivatives didn’t cause the 
financial crisis in 2008, but have been blamed for increasing systemic risk, after it the weak 
structure of the OTC derivatives markets was shown. OTC derivatives benefit financial markets 
and the wider economy by improving the pricing of risk, adding to liquidity, and helping market 
participants to manage their respective risks100. Regarding the OTC the previous regulations, as 
MIFID I, didn’t treat its regulation neither its transparency requirements. 
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As revealed by the recital 53 of the Directive 2004/39/EC “it’s not the intention of this 
Directive to require the application of pre-trade transparency rules to transactions carried out 
on an OTC basis, the characteristics of which include that they are ad-hoc and irregular and 
are carried out with the wholesale counterparties and are part of a business relationship which 
is itself characterised by dealings above standard market size, and where the deals are carried 
out outside the system usually used by the firm concerned for its business as a systematic 
internaliser”101. 
As said before the crisis showed lacks into this market. The limited transparency of the 
market increased the risk-taking because regulators did not have a clear picture of how OTC 
derivatives were traded. On the other hand, if this particular market is used responsibly it can 
provide liquidity and risk management benefits to the financial system102. 
Now we are going to have a look of how a transaction on the OTC works. An OTC trade is 
negotiated between buyer and seller. The aspect of it is that the two parties can decide if they 
want to make the transaction using a central counterparty which will assume responsibilities 
for the trade. Over-the-Counter trades are centrally cleared if both the parties accept to give the 
trade to a central counterparty (CCP), obviously the CCP has the right to refuse this allocation. 
To reduce risks, the regulators have increased the use of CCP for OTC derivatives trades. The 
traders on the OTC can incur into losses through two ways: if the performance of the underlying 
assets doesn’t respect the predictions or if the counterparty makes default103. Here any loss of 
the counterparty is the gain of the other. Moreover, every counterparty is exposed to the default 
of the other. 
The level of systemic risk is reached by the counterparty credit risk when the failure of a 
market participant might trigger large unexpected losses on its derivatives trades, that could 
damage the financial condition of one or more of its counterparties. 
Another scenario of systematic risk can happen when a large OTC derivatives market 
participant fail, this can lead to a “fire sale”104 that brings to a higher price volatility or price 
distortion. This risk can be reduced receiving the guarantee by a central counterparty, usually 
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called a clearing house. The CCP is in between the two original counterparties, acting as the 
seller and the buyer. 
CCP being exposed to the risks due to transactions has to be able to manage them also in 
hard situations in other words it has to be resilient.    
                    
To be financially resilient a CCP depends on a stringent membership access, a robust 
margining105 regime, a clear default management procedure and on a significant financial 
resource that back its performance. All the members of a CCP have to provide capital to a 
pooled CCP fund. This fund is an additional level of protection, after the initial margin, to cover 
losses caused by the failure or bankruptcy of a member to perform on a cleared derivative. 
Although the OTC derivatives markets are no regulated and they increase the systemic risk, 
their cancellation would lead more harm than good.  
OTC needs to exist because it allows the existence of derivatives that are not actively 
traded and also it give a wide choice to investors and operating companies. Further, large 
companies rely on OTC derivatives to hedge their risks that do not have a close match available 
on organized exchanges, and as we know remaining unhedged can be costly106. 
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Figure 2 How a CCP works 
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At this point knowing the importance of the OTC derivatives markets in 2009 the world 
financial leaders set a meeting, the G20 Finance ministers and Central Bank Governors, in 
Pittsburgh to discuss about an OTC derivatives markets reform. The aim of this meeting was to 
improve over-the-counter derivatives market. Before the end of 2012 the standardized contracts 
have to be traded on the trading venues or electronic trading platforms, when it’s suitable. 
Moreover, they have to be cleared via CCP. Further, the contracts that are not standardized has 
to be reported to trade repositories. 
Another kind of contract the non-centrally cleared must fulfil higher capital 
requirements. Going on it was asked to FSB and its members to improve transparency in the 
derivatives markets, to reduce systemic risk and to improve the protection against the market 
abuses107. Trying to do this the G20 meeting in Pittsburgh fixed at the top of their agenda five 
points108 to work on: 
• Try to bring all OTC derivative contracts to trade repositories109: this point can be 
reached in two different ways. One is requiring to market participants to report all the needed 
information on their OTC derivatives portfolio to the competent authority. The other one is forcing 
the market participants to point out the information regarding their OTC derivatives portfolio to a 
trade repository. 
• Take all standardised OTC derivative contracts on exchange: to do so there two 
possible policy options. The first one can be ordering the publication of aggregate position 
information. The second one is to give both aggregate and individual position information.   
• Improving transparency through central counterparties110:for this purpose, we need 
to increase the use of CCPs clearing. This objective is reachable with different options. First basing 
on the existing initiatives and incentives to improve the use of CCPs clearing. Moreover, obtain 
additional industry obligations to use the CCPs clearing. At last set as mandatory the use of CCPs 
clearing for OTC derivatives that respect predefined criteria. 
• Setting higher capital requirements for non-centralized cleared contracts 
• Control regularly where these previous measures are enough to enhance market 
transparency, mitigate systemic risk and protect against market abuse 
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3. MIFID II 
After the burst of the real subprime bubble in the 2007-2008 the European parliament 
and council was inevitably forced to start a “legislation cascade” oriented to increase to 
regulation of banking and financial industry. The president of the European Commission Jean-
Claude Juncker111 said that the European regulation for the bank’s sector has to be renewed 
exploiting the Capital Markets Union (CMU). To increase the economy’s financing the capital 
markets shall be developed moreover, it needs to be integrated with the object of making 
simpler and less expensive the collection of funds mainly for the small medium enterprises 
(SME). 112 
With his speech the president wanted to do another step to reach the Capital Markets Union. 
The European Commission immediately accepted this challenge and in the 2015 they published 
to so called green book titled “Building a Capital Markets Union” to be reached into 2019113. 
The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) agreed immediately with the proposal 
of the European Commission saying that a CMU is the natural evolution of a free market114. 
Doing a step backwards in May 15th, 2014 the Directive 2014/65/EU (Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive II – MIFID II) and the Regulation 600/2014/EU were published. This 
Directive and this Regulation were the second step to reach the CMU (the first step was the 
Directive 2004/39/EU MIFID I). The new Directive MIFID II115 is a middle way between the 
previous one MIFID I and a new version introducing a re-modelling topic already regulated. 
The recital 7 of the Directive 2014/65/EU the European Parliament and the Council 
affirmed that this new Directive and the Regulation 600/2014/EU are going to replaced partially 
the old fashioned MIFID I this recital said “Directive 2004/39/EC should therefore now partly 
be recast as this Directive and partly replaced by Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the 
European Parliament and the Council. Together, both legal instruments should form the legal 
framework governing the requirements applicable to investment firms, regulated markets, data 
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reporting services providers and third country firms providing investment services or activities 
in the Union. This Directive should therefore be read together with that Regulation….”116 
MIFID II is a complex regulatory “package” made by articles following the Lamfalussy 
scheme, and by technical standards issued by the European Commission, proposed by the 
ESMA. These technical standards set the new structure of MIFID II and of its new measures. 
These new standards show a system that is evolving continuously, thanks to them the regulator 
doesn’t need to intervene on the pillars of the regulations, in case that these standards will leave 
some breaches on the regulation of some aspects it’s due to ESMA and to the National 
competent authorities fulfil these breaches117. 
MIFID II goes alongside with the detailed Regulation 600/2014/EU (MIFIR) the technical 
standards are founded also into this regulation. MIFIR is not the only regulation which needs 
to be looked at to better understand and to have full picture of the European Commission’s plan. 
MIFID II is linked also with the European Market Infrastructure Regulation 648/2012/EU 
(EMIR) and the Packaged Retail and Insurance-based Investment Products regulation (PRIIPs). 
MIFID II keeps the division between financial services in one side and on the other the 
trading venues. Obviously respect to the Directive 2004/39/EC the new package of regulation 
introduced with MIFID II made some changes and analyse deeper some aspects. This new 
directive wants to be straighter, so the rules are more prescribed and more focus on every 
detail118. 
The Directive 2014/65/EU was at first supposed to be incorporated into national law by 3rd 
July 2017 but because of the huge changes that this operation required with the Directive 
2016/1034/EU119 this application was postponed by one year. “In light of the exceptional 
circumstances and in order to enable ESMA, NCAs and stakeholder to complete the operational 
implementation, it is appropriate to defer the date by which the Member States need to apply 
the measures transporting Directive 2014/65/EU and the date by which the repeal of Directive 
2004/39/EC is to take effect by 12 months until 3rd January 2018. Reposts and reviews should 
be deferred accordingly. It is also appropriate to defer the date by which the Member States 
need to transpose Directive 2014/65/EU to 3rd July 2017” with this paragraph the Directive 
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2016/1034/EU was affirming the defer of the application of MIFID II. Finally, the Directive 
2014/65/EU applies January the 3rd 2018, it’s incorporated into the national laws of 31 countries 
(28 from the European Union plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway).  
As seen before MIFID II and MIFIR were introduced because the crisis of 2008 shown 
some breaches into the previous directive. These two measures taken by the European 
Commission faced the lacks in three main fields: 
1. The transparency rules have to be applied to instruments similar to capital 
instruments, to instruments different from capital instruments and to the market operator 
that were partially or not regulated so far. 
2. Market integrity: changes are introduced to guarantee equal conditions between 
the different trading venues taking into account the technologic development. 
3. The investors’ protection is strengthened mainly through incentives, introducing 
measures to protect the clients and rules about the product governance. 
To fulfil the lacks into the three breaches above MIFID II has been introduced with the 
aims of120: 
• Ensuring that organised trading takes place on regulated platforms, the 
objective is to close loopholes in the financial markets’ structure. A new regulated trading 
platform is settled to capture a maximum of unregulated trades. This is the so-called 
Organised Trading Facility (OTF) that will exist alongside the regulated markets and the 
multilateral trading facility. The OTF will substitute the Systematic Internaliser into the 
definition of trading venues121. 
• Improving the transparency and oversight of financial markets-including 
derivatives markets- and addressing some shortcomings in commodity derivatives 
markets, the transparency requirements that apply before and after the trade of a financial 
instrument are strengthen, for example when market participants have to publish 
information on the prices of financial instruments122. 
• Limiting speculation on commodities, speculation on commodities is reduced 
with the introduction of a harmonised EU system which sets limits on the position held in 
commodity derivatives123. 
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• Introducing rules on algorithmic and high frequency trading, controls must 
be established for trading activities which are done electronically at a high speed, the so-
called ‘high frequency trading’ (HFT). The increased use of technology lead to potential 
risks that can be mitigated by a combination of rules to ensure that these trading techniques 
do not create disorder into the market124. 
• Enhancing investor protection and improving conduct of business rules as 
well as conditions for competition in the trading and clearing of financial instruments, 
investment firms shall act in accordance with the clients’ best interests while providing them 
investment services. These firms should safeguard the assets of their clients and be sure that 
the products they intend to launch are designed to meet the need of final clients. Investor 
shall receive increased information on services and products offered or sold to them. The 
investment firms have to ensure that staff remuneration and performance assessments are 
not organised in a way that goes against the interests of the clients. This can happen when 
performance targets and remunerations provide an incentive for staff to recommend a 
financial product instead of another that would meet the clients’ needs in a better way125. 
MIFID II, as said before and affirmed by itself, goes alongside with the Regulation 
600/2014/EU (MIFIR). MIFIR, being introduce at the same time and for the same reason, has 
the same objectives of MIFID II. It regulates pre and post-trade transparency in relation to 
competent authorities and investors, the requirements and obligations of data service providers, 
establishes the obligation to negotiate derivatives in trading centres and certain supervisory 
action.126 This Regulation sets requirements on127: 
• Disclosure of data on trading activity to the public. 
• Disclosure of transaction data to regulators and supervisors. 
• Mandatory trading of derivatives on organised venues. 
• Removal of barriers between trading venues and providers of clearing services to 
ensure more competition. 
• Specific supervisory actions regarding financial instruments and positions in 
derivatives. 
The other Regulation that we can find alongside MIFID II and MIFIR is the EMIR. It 
is about the OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories. As it is written in 
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the recital 10 of this Regulation its scope is to safeguard the stability of financial markets in 
during emergency situations.128 This Regulation sets out the criteria for determining whether or 
not different classes of OTC derivative contracts should be subject to a clearing obligations129. 
The last Regulation that goes alongside MIFID II and MIFIR is the Regulation 1286/2014/EU 
on key information documents for packaged retail and insurance-based investment products. 
The aim of this Regulation is to settle uniform rules on the format and content of the key 
information document to be drawn up by PRIIP manufacturers130. 
3.1 Differences between MIFID I and MIFID II  
Then the combination of this Directive and these three Regulations were supposed to 
give a protection and a regulation as close as possible to the full one. The International 
organisation of securities markets supervisors (IOSCO) recognize the key aim of the Directive 
as “protecting the investors” and “ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent”131. 
To protect the investor in the best way possible MIFID II was directed also to the activity 
of financial consulting, for the first time it became mandatory, for the financial consultants, 
informing the clients on the financial activity they were doing. So MIFID II settled rules about 
the different procedures and the different services offered132. MIFID II introduced measures of 
product governance and product intervention. This mechanism was introduced to protect the 
investors and to help them in choosing the financial products133. This new way of relating with 
the clients underlines a change into the regulation which is now finalised to optimize the offered 
service. This happen because the changes into the legislation have modified the relationship 
between the investor and the consultant who is not a seller of a product anymore, but its role is 
to help the clients providing a service (giving personalised recommendations). 
MIFID I lasting only a decade is a recognition that it leaned too much towards market 
efficiency, but not sufficiently towards market integrity. MIFID I through the introduction of  
Trading Venues increased the competition into the market but at the cost of transparency. 
Thereafter MIFID II extended the pre and post-trade transparency rules to the non-equity 
products to improve the price discovery. To avoid that these requirements are waived MIFID 
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II created a centralised system for data consolidation and tightened the operational and 
governance requirements for market intermediaries134. Further MIFID II obtained a main 
international role about the financial regulation for the Member States, most important it 
introduced a unique regime of access, to the markets of the European Union, for subjects having 
their head offices in third countries. This regime is based on an evaluation made by the 
European Commission about extra-border services and investment activities with retail 
investors and qualified counterparties135. 
Another change brought by MIFID II regards regulated markets and investment firms, 
from MIFID I the length and the scope are grown exponentially. The investment firms’ business 
rules have been greatly extended136. New provisions were introduced about the high- frequency 
trading (HFT) and also regarding the Organised trading Facilities (OTFs). Obviously, the 
implementation and the adaptation of the system to the new and modified provisions introduced 
by MIFID II needs lot of time. Furthermore, it was necessary to collect and store a huge amount 
of data to guarantee the best execution in a broader set of market segments. MIFID II has some 
longer-term objectives regarding the banks and the trading venues. For what concern the banks 
MIFID II want to change structurally the universal banks, and the way in which banks fund 
research. The banks will be forced to change the way they finance analysts to be able to meet 
the requirement to create research accounts. Moreover, MIFID II, as above, will bring changes 
also to the trading venues landscape. The scope for MTFs will be widened, a new component 
of the trading venues will be introduced, and it will replace the systematic internaliser. This 
component is the called organized trading facility (OTF). Besides MIFID II will lead to a 
reduced attractiveness of the over the counter (OTC) markets. New trading platforms for bonds 
and derivatives will emerge further to the new price transparency requirements. 
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4. TRADING VENUES 2.0 
Differently from its previous version MIFID II gave a definition of trading venue. “Trading 
venue means a regulated market, an MTFs or an OTFs”137with this article (Art. 4(24)) the 
European Parliament and the Council wanted to give a clear and a finite picture of what a trading 
venue is to set properly what is not an OTC. 
Trading venues were subjected to some changes with the introduction of MIFID II. First 
of all, this new Directive added the Organised Trading Facilities (OTFs) as trading venues 
alongside regulated markets and Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs). Then, the systematic 
internalisers were downgraded, thus means they were part of the concept of trading venues 
anymore. However, these systematic internaliser obtained an expansion of their facilities 
becoming able to also trade non-equity products. The MTFs with MIFID II have been taken up 
as the regime for alternative trading platforms, as competition to the main regulated markets, 
but also for the secondary markets of the traditional exchanges138. 
The OTFs were created after the G-20 which decided to bring all OTC standardized 
contracts on exchange. Moreover, the OTFs can execute orders on a discretionary basis, they 
were introduced to reduce dark pools, to tackle the fragmentation of order flow and to bring 
systematic internalisers and some activities of broker crossing network into the open. MIFID II 
in certain way re-introduce the concentration rule linked with the trading venues. It makes a 
distinction between equity instruments and derivatives. The equity instruments have to be 
negotiated only on regulated markets, MTFs, systematic internaliser or on a third country 
trading venues. For what concern the derivatives they need to be negotiated on regulated 
markets, MTFs and OTFs139140.  For all the three components of trading venues (regulated 
markets, MTFs and OTFs) the platform’s operator (market operator or an investment firm) is 
neutral, this means that for them it’s forbidden to trade against their own proprietary capital 
(the pro-tradeing). Furthermore, it’s still possible for a systematic internaliser to organise 
trading. A systematic internaliser is able to execute client transactions against its own 
proprietary capital, this is possible because the SI doesn’t bring together third party buying and 
selling interests as regulated markets, MTFs and OTFs do.  
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To do business on regulated markets, MTFs, OTFs and systematic internaliser the 
supervisory authority has to approve their businesses, therefore this supervisory authority has 
the role to continuously supervise the firms and their activities. Even if they get this 
authorisation from the competent authority a transaction is considered to be executed on a 
Trading Venues only when the buying and selling interest of two parties is brought together by 
the Trading venue either on a discretionary or non-discretionary basis or, when the buying and 
selling interest of two parties is not brought together by the trading venue either on a 
discretionary or non-discretionary way, but the transaction is nonetheless subject to the rules of 
that Trading Venue and is executed in compliance with those rules141. 
Knowing the importance of these financial firms, the supervisor focuses its attention on 
financial stability, risk management, business plan and it has to ensure that fit and proper 
standards are set for shareholders and boards of directors142. As we know the definitions of the 
three kinds of trading venues are very close to each other, however the general regulatory 
approach is different in some aspects. 
Into regulated markets the first need is to regulate this type of market for issuing and 
trading in equities. In here the market operator is forced to match orders that traders put in the 
trading system without the obligation of best execution, this makes the market neutral.  The 
traditional regulation of stock exchanges has focused on the exchanges’ rights and duties to 
establish membership and trading rules, disclosure obligations for issuers listed on the market 
and, in part, market surveillance143. 
On the other hand, the starting point for the operation of a MTFs and an OTFs is that 
investment firms can provide plenty of investment services and one of them is trading facility. 
Investment firms’ main business is to advise clients and trade on their best interest and on their 
behalf, this creates a relationship between the firm and its clients. Therefore, it’s important that 
the investment firms ensure to: act honestly, fairly, professionally and for the best interest of 
the clients, that any conflicts of interest are identified and prevented and that investment firms 
provide clients adequate and relevant information to enable them to make informed investment 
decisions and to assess investments’ risk144. 
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For an investment firm running a MTF or an OTF activities can be an ancillary activity 
and can therefore be influenced by the principal-agent relationship145. Moreover, the regulation 
of regulated markets seems to be more detailed and more focused on the integrity of the market 
conversely to the one of MTFs and OTFs that is focused on the best interest of clients and the 
obligation of best execution146. Further, the authorisation to operate a MTF or an OTF requires 
a detailed description of the functioning of the market, rules and procedures for a fair and 
orderly trading and also the criteria for the efficient execution orders. Additionally, MTFs and 
OTFs must give enough public information to enable traders and investors to make informed 
investment decisions147. Also, the duty to monitor compliance with the rules of the market and 
report breaches to the supervisory authorities is the same for all three kinds of trading venues. 
This duty has the odd of adding expenses in running a MTF or an OTF and this caused a 
decrease into the volume of trading compared to the one on the regulated markets148. 
Rules of governing access to the market are based on objective criteria. Although only 
regulated markets are obliged to give all investment firms access to the market directly or 
becoming remote member149. Most importantly the three kind of trading venues differ regarding 
the trading rules and the financial instruments that they trade. As the definitions of regulated 
markets and MTFs suggest they both have non-discretionary and predetermined rules for the 
execution of orders in their system. They are forced to have and to follow these rules. On the 
other hand, OTFs, always following the best execution principle and the OTFs own trading 
rules, may match traders’ orders discretionarily150. 
With MIFID II the transparency requirements have the priority for the Commission. 
These requirements are founded into the MIFIR which applies the same pre and post-
transparency ones to the three kinds of trading venues. The transparency requirements are 
different basing on the type of financial instruments and the type of trading151. MIFID II after 
setting the principles regarding how to do business on the Trading Venues and which rules the 
market operators and investment firms need to follow. European Council introducing this 
Directive tried, always looking forward to improve the clients’ protection, to ensure that if a 
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regulated market; a MTF or an OTF suspends or removes a financial instrument from trading, 
it should communicate this to other trading venue and to the competent authority. If the removal 
or the suspension is caused by the non-disclosure of information about the issuer or regarding 
the financial instrument, other trading venues will also be obliged to suspend or remove the 
financial instrument, unless this will cause significant damage to investors’ interests or the 
orderly functioning of the market152. 
4.1 Transparency for Trading venues 
One the main point on which the MIFID II and the MIFIR are focus are the transparency 
requirements. We can find these requirements in the Title II of the Regulation 600/2014/EU. In 
the MIFIR we find a very clear distinction between the transparency regarding the equity 
instruments and one regarding the non-equity instruments. To make it clear when we talk about 
equity instrument we are talking about shares, depositary receipts, ETFs, certificates and other 
similar financial instruments. 
The Article 3 of MIFIR sets the pre-trade transparency requirements for trading venues 
in respect of equity instruments. It shows that market operators and investment firms operating 
a trading venue have to make public their current bid and offer prices and also the depth of 
trading interests at those prices. Further, these investment firms and market operators working 
on a trading venue should make those information public on a continuous basis during normal 
trading hours. Obviously these requirements are balanced basing on the types of trading system 
including hybrid and periodic auction trading system. The arrangements employed by market 
operators and investment firms, operating a trading venue, needs to be accessible, on reasonable 
commercial terms and on a non-discriminatory basis153. 
In contrast there are some exceptional cases in which the competent authorities are able 
to postpone the obligations, regarding the publication of the information above mentioned, for 
market operators and investment firms operating a trading venue. These obligations are waived 
usually when154: 
• The system matching the orders based on a trading method in which the price of the 
equity instruments is set from the trading venue where those equity instruments were 
first admitted to trading or the most relevant market in term of liquidity, where the 
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reference price is published and is considered by market participants as a reliable 
reference price. 
• Orders that are large in scale compared with normal size. 
• Orders held in an order management facility of the trading venue pending disclosure. 
Moreover, the competent authorities before conceding a waiver shall notify to ESMA 
and to other competent authorities the use of each waiver and give an explanation about its 
functioning, including the details of the trading venue where the reference price is established. 
Notification of the willingness to grant a waiver shall be done not less than four months before 
the waiver is intended to take place. In the scenario where a competent authority of another 
Member State disagrees, the matter has to be referred to ESMA which should act following the 
powers received thanks to article 19 Regulation 1095/2010155. 
A waiver once is granted if it is used in a way that deviates from the original purpose 
set by the competent authority, which granted it, it can be withdrawn. To do not unduly damage 
price formation trading under these waivers lead to some restriction of trading: the percentage 
of trading in a financial instrument run on a trading venue under these waivers has to be limited 
to 4% of the total amount of trading in this financial instrument on all trading venues into the 
Union over the previous 12 months. 
Widening our picture, the overall Union trading in a financial instrument carried out 
under those waivers should be limited to 8% of the total in that financial instrument on all 
trading venues across the Union over the previous 12 months156. If a trading venue overtake the 
amount of trading in a financial instrument (4% and overall Union 8%) the competent authority 
that authorised the use of these waivers by that trading venue may within two working days 
stop their use on that venue in that financial instrument for a period of 6 months. To make the 
monitoring easier for ESMA the trading made under those waivers and for determining whether 
the limits (4% and overall Union 8%) have been exceeded, the operators of trading venue are 
obliged to have systems and procedures to: allow the identification of all trades that have taken 
place on its venue under those waivers; and to ensure that it doesn’t exceed the permitted 
percentage of trading allowed under those waivers (4% and overall Union 8%)157. 
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The Regulation doesn’t only settle pre-trade transparency requirements in fact in the 
article 6 it shows them. The investment firms and market operators running a trading venue 
have to publish the price, the volume and the time of the transactions done in respect of equity 
instruments or similar financial instruments traded on that trading venue. These publications 
have to be made as close as possible to the real time158. Furthermore, the market operators and 
the investment firms are forced to allow the access, on fair commercial terms and on a non-
discretionary basis, to the dispositions they employ to publish the post-trade information. 
However, in some cases it’s possible to obtain the authorisation of deferred publication. 
This deferred publication can be allowed by the competent authority regarding 
transactions that are larger in scale compared with the normal size for that share159. In some 
cases, competent authorities from different Member State disagree and the matter is brought to 
ESMA that can decide how to manage it, behaving accordingly with the powers received by 
Article 19 Regulation 1095/2010. Then, Article 64 of MIFID II requires the publication of some 
information, at this regard ESMA develops regulatory technical standards to enable this 
publication. About this the details of transaction of equity instruments that market operators 
operating a trading venues and investment firms operating a trading and a systematic 
internaliser have had done needs to be made public. 
In chapter two of MIFIR we found the transparency requirements for non-equity 
instruments. To obtain the pre-trade transparency requirements for non-equity instruments the 
operators of a trading venue need to publish their bid and offer prices and the depth of their 
trading interest. They also have to make this information available and public on a continuous 
basis. Additionally, the arrangements employed by the trading venue’s operators have to be 
accessible on commercial term. If and only if a waiver is granted the market operators and the 
investment firms operating a trading venue are obliged at least to publish their pre-trade bid and 
offer price as close as possible to the final price160. The obligation, to publish the information 
above mentioned, required to the operators of trading venue can be waived by the competent 
authority. 
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The obligation is waived when161: 
• Derivatives that are not concern to the trading obligation exploited by the Article 
28 and other financial instruments without a liquid market; 
• There is larger order in scale respect to the normal market size; 
• Signals of interest in request-for-quote and voice trading systems that are above a 
size specific to the financial instrument, that could expose liquidity providers to 
undue risk and takes into account whether the relevant market participants are retail 
or wholesale investors. 
• Package orders that follow some conditions as: one component at least is bigger in 
scale respect to the normal market size, unless a liquid market for the package order 
exists; at least a component, a financial instrument, doesn’t have a liquid market 
unless the whole order has a liquid market; all components are accomplished on a 
request-for-quote and overtake the specific size for the instrument. 
The package orders not always have a liquid market162. To have a liquid market 
they need to have some characteristics: it must have at maximum four components, all of 
them belong to the same asset class and finally not all the components are above the LIS-
threshold163. 
Before a waiver is granted, the competent authority has to make aware the ESMA 
and the other competent authorities regarding the use intended for each waiver and it has 
to explain about their functioning. The intention of conceding a waiver has to be notified 
not less than four months before and ESMA within two months has to give its opinion and 
to assess the compatibility of the waiver with the requirements above mentioned. 
When another competent authority disagrees with grating a waiver from that 
competent authority this issue can be brought to the ESMA that will act in accordance with 
the article 19 Regulation 1095/2010164 and it will decide how to try to solve it. If the waiver 
is being used in a different way from the original one the competent authorities can 
withdraw it on their initiative or on request of other competent authorities. This withdrawal 
has to be notified to ESMA before it happens giving all the reason why it happened. 
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Furthermore, the supervising competent authority has the power to suspend the post-trade 
obligations if the liquidity of the non-equity instruments, traded on the supervised trading 
venues, falls below a threshold defined on objective criteria specific to the market for the 
financial instrument concerned165. This suspension is temporary and it cannot last more 
than three months at the first sight, it can be renewed for a period again no longer than 
three months. Before doing this, suspending or renewing the suspension, the competent 
authority has to notify its intention to the ESMA alongside a detailed explanation. ESMA 
has the duty to comment it. The threshold is calculated following parameters and methods 
set in a way that if the threshold will be reached it will show a significant decline in 
liquidity across all venues166. 
Likewise, the trading venues that trade equity instruments also the ones which trade 
non-equity need to respect their post-trade transparency requirements. At this regard the 
operators of a trading venue must publish the price, the volume and the time of the 
transactions done in respect to non-equity instruments. All the details of those transactions 
have to be reported public as close to real time as possible. Moreover, investment firms 
and market operators have to concede the access on a non-discriminatory basis to the 
arrangements used to publish the information167.  
The authorisation of deferred publication for trading venue that trades non-equity 
instruments has to be given by the competent authority. It can authorize the deferred 
publication regarding transactions that: are larger in scale respect to the normal market 
size of that financial instrument traded on a trading venue; are related to financial 
instruments without a liquid market168. To defer the publication the trading venues’ 
operators need to receive the approval from the competent authority. Further, the 
obligation of publications for trading venues managing non-equity instruments can be 
suspended. This happens when the liquidity of those financial instruments’ class goes 
under a threshold defined on objective criteria. 
The suspension cannot be longer than three months however it can be suspended 
or renewed again for three months. The intention of suspending or renewing the 
suspension has to be notified to ESMA which has to issue its opinion to the competent 
authority as soon as possible. The competent authorities with an authorisation of deferred 
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publication can ask for the publication of limited details of a transaction, allow the 
omission of the publication of the volume of an individual transaction during a period of 
deferral. Then they can allow the aggregated publication of different transactions 
regarding non-equity instruments which are not sovereign debt. On the other hand, about 
the sovereign debt instruments the competent authority can allow the publication of several 
transactions in an aggregated form for an indefinite period169. 
4.2 Italian Scenario 
Before going into a deep analysis of the trading venues remodelled by MIFID II we 
will have an overview of how Italian financial market is regulated and which are its main 
points. This market is regulated by the TUF (Testo Unico della Finanza) and by the 
CONSOB (Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa). The TUF was subjected to 
some modifications with the introduction of MIFID II. The article 63 of TUF confirms that 
every multilateral system it will act as a regulated market, MTF or OTF, obviously the 
requirements for them are different, we first will have a look of the one for the regulated 
markets170. 
In the first section Title II of TUF is reported that the management and the operating 
duties in a regulated market are done by Limited companies including the ones without 
making money orientation. The market operator needs to meet the requirements underlined 
at the article 64 TUF, it has to give financial services, to control and ensure that the 
requirements are respected. CONSOB which works alongside TUF has the role to find all 
the activities that can be run by the market operator, it also sets the organisational 
requirements for the market operator. Moreover, it shall verify if a market operator of a 
regulated market can manage and make business also on a MTF or on an OTF. Following 
one of the main principles enhanced by MIFID II the market operators of a regulated market 
have to notify and make public the information regarding the owner and the ones who can 
have a significant influence on the market to the CONSOB. Market operator to obtain the 
authorisation to operate as a regulated market has to make aware the CONSOB of 
information regarding the activities they are going to do, the rules of the market, their 
organizational structure and others171.  
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The article 64-quinquies of TUF sets the cases when CONSOB can withdraw the 
authorisation to the regulated market. This can happen when: the authorisation is obtained 
providing false information, the conditions to have the authorisation are not satisfied 
anymore, the regulated market is no longer working for six months172. The market operator 
has to communicate to CONSOB, the changes in the board and what the administrators has 
to do. Further, the market operator must report annually to CONSOB the composition of 
the board and a summary of the duties gave to each administrator173. A regulated market to 
exist must have some organisational requirements, about this the article 65 of TUF gave a 
list of them174 i.e. the regulated market has measures to clearly identify and manage the 
possible negative consequences, transparency rules and non-discretionary procedures 
which guarantee a fairy and an orderly playing field. Obviously the CONSOB is supposed 
to receive all the information about it from the entity that manages the regulated market175. 
Talking about the MTFs and OTFs instead their operators (investment firms and 
market operators) have different requirements as rules and transparent procedures 
guarantying correct and order transactions moreover, there should be at least three active 
clients or participants, each of them having the chance to interact with the others regarding 
the price formation. Before starting to do business then the operators of MTFs and OTFs 
must notify to CONSOB not only what is required by the Regulation 824/2016 but also 
what is required by the Article 20 of Regolamento dei Mercati176. The operators of MTFs 
and OTFs following the article 65-bis of TUF use the necessary measures to have a fair 
regulation of the controlled trading system, therefore, they shall clearly inform the 
members or the clients concerning their responsibilities177. The articles 65-ter and the 65-
quarter show specific requirements for MTFs and OTFs. Specially managers of OTFs, 
always considering what is written into the Regulation 824/2016, shall inform CONSOB 
about: the reason why the system cannot be a regulated market, a MTF or a systematic 
internaliser; the way in which he will operate on a discretionary basis and also a deep 
description of the future uses of the matched principal178. 
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Another difference between the kinds of trading venues is about the general criteria to 
be admitted to trade. The regulated markets have clear and transparent rules regarding the 
admission of financial instruments to trade, they must have and keep efficient mechanism 
to check that the characteristics of the trade respect the European Union requirements that 
are about continuous and ad-hoc information. 
Conversely MTFs’ and OTFs’ managers have to set transparent rules concerning the 
criteria to decide the financial instrument that can be traded, moreover, they give and make 
sure that sufficient information to help the client to make his investment choice are 
available easily179. On the other hand, the three kinds of trading venues also have common 
requirements, they have to be resilient, they shall operate on a continuous basis and they 
should guarantee fair and order negotiation during hard market situations. Their systems 
and mechanism are asked to meet some requirements (see Art.65(2)-sexies TUF). 
Trading venues are obliged to send to CONSOB before March every year a self-rating 
document following the instruction of article 2 Regulation 584/2017 about: governance, 
pre and post-trade controls, own trading system capacity and competences of the 
workers180. The market operators working into regulated markets, MTFs and OTFs and the 
investment firms operating the multilateral trading systems to respect the transparency 
principal they have to notify to CONSOB and to Bank of Italy the concluded agreement 
with counterparties after 45 working days. Notified information are: terms of the 
agreement, links between counterparties and regulated markets, or MTFs or OTFs and the 
conditions to guarantee the efficiency of the concluded operations181. Additionally, the 
trading venues inform CONSOB about eventual changes on procedures and criteria for the 
activity of due diligence, a description of suitability trials given to the clients, an analysis 
regarding the members’ algorithm and the procedures used to give the authorisation to 
access182.  
4.2.1 Borsa Italiana The Manager of Italian Financial Markets  
The most important operator of the Italian financial market is the Borsa Italiana S.p.a. 
Borsa Italiana is a limited company making part of the London Stock Exchange Group. 
Borsa Italiana is an operator of several regulated markets and MTFs, obviously it can 
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manage the ones which are previously authorised by the CONSOB. Borsa Italiana has the 
right to set the minimum amount tradeable for each financial instrument and for each market 
taking into account the functionality of the market and set an easier way to access to the 
market183 
 
                       
First, we need to identify who is admitted to trading on Borsa Italiana. It has its own 
regulation, at the article 3.1.1 of it, it’s shown that can trade on Borsa Italiana the ones 
authorised by law subject to trade184. The list of operators that can trade after the introduction 
of MIFID II had some changes. The article 25 and 67 of TUF in the modified version after the 
Directive 2014/65/EU report that SIM (società di intermediazione mobilare) and Italian banks, 
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previous authorisation from CONSOB, can trade in the Member States and in the no EU 
countries. 
On the other hand, the community banks and investment firms can trade on the Italian 
regulated markets and MTFs. The operators admitted to trade are divided in macro-categories: 
investment firms, community and Italian banks; no EU banks and investment firms with 
branches in Italy, they are put into the register of third countries firms held by ESMA; entities 
different from banks and investment firms authorised according to TUF185. During the 
procedure of admission to trade operators have to send the request to Borsa Italiana, after one 
month after the reception of the request Borsa Italian will make a valuation of the operator. 
Borsa Italiana have to control if: the number of professional operators is sufficient, 
enough measures of guarantee liquidation, adequate internal procedures to control the trading 
activity, have the ability to suspend the trading flow, to cancel orders and if the technological 
system is good enough for trading considering the amount and the size of the transactions186. 
Moreover, MIFID II introduces new requirements for the operators to obtain the authorisation 
to trade, these requirements need to be fulfilled on a continuous basis. The new requirements 
to be fulfilled by the operators are: do controls pre and post-trade; the operators need to be 
professional of trading; the kill functionality187 is needed and a discipline on the Direct 
Electronic Access. Even if regulation of Borsa Italiana was already close to MIFID II regarding 
the participation requirements, the new Directive brought some integrations. 
With the development of the society also the way to trade changed, nowadays many 
traders trade using the algo trading. At this point MIFID II introduced requirements about it and 
Borsa Italiana added them to its sample. The operators who trade using the algo-trading have 
to announce their activity as algo traders, they need to test their algorithm and they have to 
point out the identification code of the algorithm. There is a branch of algo-trading the so-called 
High-Frequency-Trading (HFT) with the new Directive the operators using this way to trading 
have to notify it188. Besides MIFID II enhanced the regulation of Borsa Italiana about the 
cancellation of orders. The obligation of having policies used to specify when it’s possible to 
cancel an order and also to notify if the technical procedure to cancel orders are available into 
the operators’ systems. 
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In its regulation book Borsa Italiana specifies how the trades are done. There are two 
different ways one is an auction and the other one is on continuous basis189. The phases of the 
negotiations are four: in the first one the open price auction is decided, the second is the 
negotiation on a continuous basis, in third one the closed auction priced is set and in the last 
one we have the negotiation at the closed price auction190 
Then there are two kinds of proposals of negotiation, it is based on the operator. If the 
operator is a specialist, then the proposal has to be done in a non-anonymous way on the 
opposite with an operator who is not a specialist the propose has to be anonymous. These 
proposals include information about the type of financial instrument to trade, its quantity, the 
type of transaction, the way of execution and, they need to specify when they come from an 
algorithm. Moreover, they contain parameters based on the time and other information to allow 
to Borsa Italiana to respect Regulation 580/2017/EU. 
4.2.2 Mercato Telematico Azionario (MTA) 
Mercato Telematico Azionario is the main Italian equity market for mid and large size 
capitalized companies that meet the highest standards. Into this market are traded shares, 
convertible bonds, warrants and options. Thanks to high international standards, it’s possible to 
attract professional and private investors191. 
First of all, to be listed on MTA is required to authorization from Borsa Italiana. The 
authorization is given if some requirements are respected i.e. a minimum capitalization of EUR 
40 mln is needed then it’s required a free float of at least 25%. Furthermore, the companies 
which want to be listed into MTA has to be have a strategic vision, a good financial situation, 
a good competitive orientation and they are supposed to act in the best way possible to increase 
the chances to enhance value for the shareholders. 
Until June 28th 2010 the MTA was divided into three segments, this division was based 
on the dimension of the companies and on the satisfied requirements. The first segment was the 
Blue Chip, this was for the companies with more than 1 bln capitalization. Then there was the 
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Star for mid-size companies with a capitalization between Eur 40 mln and Eur 1 bln, the 
characteristic of this segment was that these companies must satisfy specific duty regarding 
transparency, liquidity and corporate governance. The last branch was the Standard Segment 
for the companies with a capitalization between Eur 40 mln and Eur 1 bln but without the need 
to respects requirements as strict as the one for the Star segment192. As said before this was the 
MTA’s form until the 28th of June because after that day Borsa Italiana, to make a simple 
segmentation of it, it was decided to take off the segment Blue chip and Standard. 
At first in Italy was introduced FTSE193 Italia, this index was already making a 
distinction of the shares basing on capitalization and liquidity. The main detected categories 
were Large-cap, mid-cap, small-cap. On the other side the Star segment was still alive and it 
was introduced the MTA International alongside it194. Star segment as we saw is for the 
companies with a capitalization between Eur 40 mln and Eur 1 bln, the companies belonging 
to this segment must have other characteristics and also have to respect high quality 
requirements. They must keep a high level of transparency and a well develop willingness to 
communicate, they are required to have at least 35% of free float (high liquidity) at IPO then at 
least 20%, then a corporate governance aligned with international standards. The transparency 
requirements consist in having available information on their websites also in English195. 
Regarding the governance requirements, the presence in the board of directors of an 
independent direct is needed then these companies should provide incentives to the top 
managements. Thanks to this availability to respect the requirements set by the MTA to get 
accepted to the Star segment, the SME, being part of Standard segment, benefit of a high 
visibility given by Borsa Italiana. The instruments traded on the Star segment are shares, 
convertible bonds, pre-emptive rights and warrant.  
The other segment was introduced in July 2007 in the MTA International segment in 
which are traded only shares. This segment is used by the MTA to trade more liquid assets 
across EU keeping the Italian prices and ways. In addition, into this segment it can be traded 
non-Italian assets issued by foreign companies already quoted in other EU markets. Moreover, 
Borsa Italiana in 2016 decided to change the kind of trading venues, in fact from regulated 
market it became a MTF196. If a company wants to be part of this market it has to send the 
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request or it can be send by an intermediary. To be admitted to this segment shares need to be 
already listed in a EU market for at least 18 months. Then the shares traded on MTA 
international cannot be included in any of Borsa Italiana’s indexes197. Additionally, in this 
segment is required the presence of two specialists for every share, this is a way to guarantee 
the liquidity of the financial instruments. 
As the article 4.3.1 of Regolamento dei Mercati organizzati e gestiti da Borsa Italiana 
affirms the negotiations on the MTA are based on a mechanism of auction followed by a 
continuous negotiation until another auction to end the negotiation198. Obviously this 
mechanism has to follow a schedule during the trading hours: from 8 a.m. to 9 a.m. there is the 
opening auction (pre-auction, confirmation, opening phase and the conclusion of contracts); 
from 9 a.m. to 5:25 p.m. continuous trading; from 5:25 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. it’s time for the closing 
auction (pre-auction, validation, closing phase and the conclusion of contracts); closing the 
trading day from 5:30 p.m. to 5:40 p.m. there the trades at the closing auction price (order entry 
phase and the trading phase)199. In this market there are different prices one the so-called price 
of reference that is based on the closing auction price, then there is the official price that is equal 
to the weighted average for each asset traded during the day, there is also the static price that is 
the one of the day before and further there is the dynamic one that is the price of the last 
concluded contract during the current trading day200. To make the transactions and the 
negotiations easier for the operators into the market, Borsa Italiana shares the information useful 
for the negotiations using its channels as quick as possible. Moreover, Borsa Italiana give the 
information about the market conditions and every operation done by the operators201.    
4.3 Regulated Market202  
Before starting with a deeper analysis it’s useful to give a definition of multilateral system 
which is the main pillar of the definitions of the three types of trading venues. A multilateral 
system is defined as “any system of facility in which multiple third-party buying and selling 
trading interests in financial instruments are able to interact in the system”203. Thanks to this 
definition it’s possible to understand the goal of the European Parliament and Council, through 
these multilateral systems they wanted to allow the competition on the markets and the free but 
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regulated trading of financial instruments. It is important to know the definition of multilateral 
system because it is the point in common of the three types of trading venues. Through the 
definition of the types of trading venues as multilateral system the concept of bilateral system 
it’s excluded. A bilateral system is where an investment firm is involved in every trade on its 
own account, also as a riskless counterparty between the buyer and the seller204.  
We now focus our attention on the regulated markets the older kind of trading venues. By 
MIFID II205 they are defined in the same way as the one in Directive 2004/39/EC. Now we will 
analyze the different pars into the definition. Regulated market is at first defined as a 
multilateral system which is operated by a market operator, with this sentence and accordingly 
to recital 7 of MIFIR the bilateral systems206 are excluded207. Then this multilateral system has 
the duty to bring together buying and selling interests of multiple trading parties, these interests 
have to be brought together in a way that it will finish in a contract to buy or sell a financial 
instrument. The creation of a contract happens only if these interests are together under the rules 
of the system. Additionally, these interests have to be taken together under non-discretionary 
rules. These rules leave the market operator of regulated markets with no discretion on how 
those buying and selling interests will interact. As we saw from the definition regulated markets 
can be operated and managed only by a market operator 
 According to the article 44 Title III of MIFID II we see that a market operator intended to 
act as a regulated market needs to receive an authorization form the Member States. This 
authorization has to be obtained also from the systems of the regulated market. First of all, 
respecting the transparency principle the market operator anger to receive the authorization has 
to provide all information, containing a schedule of his operations, the kind of businesses and 
the organizational structure. This information has to show to the competent authority that the 
regulated market has all the requirements to meet its obligations208. To keep its authorization, 
the market operator has to respect requirements regarding the organization and operation of the 
regulated market being supervised by the competent authority. Also, this competent authority 
has to review and keep under control the compliance of regulated market with Title III. Not 
only the competent authority has to check that the regulated market complies with the 
requirements in that title, this is also a duty that the market operator that manages or operates 
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the market has. Moreover, the market operator has the possibility to use the rights corresponding 
to the regulated market that he manages209. Obviously once that the authorization is obtained it 
can be withdrawn by the competent authority if: the regulated market doesn’t use the 
authorization for 12 months, it clearly renounces to it or it didn’t use it for the previous six 
months. Another possibility that will lead to the withdrawn is when the authorization is obtained 
through false statements or doing something irregular. If the conditions under which the 
authorization was given are not meet anymore the authorization is withdrawn210.  
Market operators are made by more than one “body”, at this regard the managers (bodies) 
of market operator are required to have a good reputation and to have sufficient knowledge, 
skills and experience to do their duties. As same as for the market operators also the 
management bodies have to fulfil different requirements: they should spend enough time 
performing their functions in the market operator, then market operators should spend enough 
resources to ensure that the management bodies will be prepared211. In order to have an effective 
management of a regulated market and to prevent also conflict of interest the management 
bodies of a market operator has to be aware of the implementation of the governance 
arrangements. These management bodies have also another duty that is to control the efficiency 
of the arrangements made by the market operators’ governance, doing this they want to repair 
some breaches212. Also, in this case the authorization can be withdrawn from the competent 
authority. this can happen when the management bodies of the market operator do not have a 
good reputation, do not have enough knowledge, experience, skills and do not spend sufficient 
time to do their duties.  
Market operators have to do also one more task, they have to report the identity of the 
members of its management body or any changes of it to the competent authority213. ESMA 
should issue few guidelines regarding some aspects as the notion of sufficient time commitment 
of a member of the management body to do the members’ functions214. At the article 46 of 
MIFID II we find the third kind of person who needs to fulfil requirements to be linked with 
the market operators or the regulated market, these are the persons who exercise significant 
influence over the management of the regulated market.  
                                                          
209 Article 44(3) Directive 2014/65/EU 
210 Article 44(5) Directive 2014/65/EU 
211 Article 45(2) Directive 2014/65/EU 
212 Article 45(6) Directive 2014/65/EU 
213 Article 45(8) Directive 2014/65/EU 
214 Article 45(9) Directive 2014/65/EU 
49 
 
These persons obviously must be suitable it’s a task that the Member States have to do. 
Further, operator of regulated market must notify to competent authority, then publish, 
information about the holder of regulated market and of the market operator, most important 
the identity of any parties that can influence the management have to be reported215. After the 
requirements for the persons involved into the regulated market at the article 47 of MIFID II 
the Member States set the requirements for the regulated market itself.  
At first the regulated market is asked to be resilient, this means that it should be able to 
manage conflict of interests between the parties involved into the regulated market, it has to 
able to identify these risks that can damage its owner, its market operator and they can threat 
the sound functioning of the market. Additionally, the regulated market is required to know 
how to face and manage the risks at which it is exposed and to take the measures to smooth 
these risks. Furthermore, the market must have dispositions for the sound management of the 
operation of the system, one of the should be the settlement of dispositions to cope with the 
risks of system disruptions. Then, as we know from the definition the regulated market must 
have non-discretionary rules and procedures to have a fair and ordered trading. Going on, to 
make the finalization of the transactions done under its system’s rules easier the regulated 
market is required to have useful and effective arrangements. The last requirement is to have 
enough financial resources, to make its functioning easier, when the authorization is obtained 
and for the future times216.  
To respect one the aims of this Directive for the market operators is forbidden to execute 
client orders against proprietary capital. There are different situations and risks into the market, 
to face and manage them the regulated market should have available an effective system, it 
should use dispositions and procedures to make its trading system resilient, it must be able to 
manage peak order and big volumes of massages, following one of the goal of the Directive it 
have to ensure a orderly trading field when hard times and conditions on the market come and 
finally it is tested to make sure that it can keep these conditions also when there is a failure of 
its trading system.  
Knowing also that a regulated market cannot be managed by investment firms, the market 
has to make written agreements with the investment firms trying to attain a market maker 
strategy on it. These agreements have to specify which are the investment firms’ duties relating 
to the provision of liquidity also if the regulated market offers incentives in terms or discounts 
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to investments firms if they will provide liquidity to the market on a regular basis217. These 
agreements are required to have a minimum number of participating investment firms, they are 
asked to post firm quotes at competitive price with the aim of bringing liquidity to the market 
regularly and on a foreseeable basis218. The respect of these written agreements from the 
investment firms has to be monitored by the regulated market which has to notify and make 
aware the competent authority regarding what is inside these agreements. Moreover, under a 
specific request they are obliged to provide more detailed information to the competent 
authority needed to satisfy itself of compliance by the regulated market.  
For the safety of the trades and traders regulated markets have to recognize and reject, 
through effective systems and procedures, orders that ex-ante are above the pre-determined 
volume and price or are simply made in a wrong way. Additionally, regulated markets are 
required by Member States to be able to stop or constraint trading where the price of a financial 
instrument was subject to a significant movement on the market or on a related one in a short 
period of time. In some cases, the regulated market can cancel, change or correct any 
transactions219. The parameters for halting trading must be appropriately calibrated considering 
the different liquidity of the asset classes and sub-classes, it is taken into account also the market 
models’ nature alongside the kinds of users. The Members States force the regulated market to 
notify to the competent authority not only the parameters for halting trading but also every 
change of them. Then the competent authorities have to inform ESMA of these changes. 
 When a regulated market halts trading on a financial instrument being liquid, that trading 
venue is asked by the Member States to have the necessary system and dispositions to notify to 
competent authorities to allow them to set a response and decide whether it’s correct halt trading 
also on other trading venues where the financial instrument is traded until the trading is resumed 
on the original market220.  
With the introduction of MIFID II the European Council wanted to regulate also the algo 
trading a form of trading introduce with the development of technologies. At this purpose the 
regulated market is asked by the Member States to have systems, dispositions and to require to 
members to test algorithms in order to be sure that the algorithmic trading system will not cause 
or participate in chaotic trading conditions, furthermore, regulated market has to know how 
manage the disorderly trading conditions raised from these algorithmic trading systems. 
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Regulated market has also to limit and enhance the minimum tick size that may be executed on 
the market221.  
Obviously regulated market to make transactions get paid through a fee which comprehend 
execution fee and ancillary fee, these fees are transparent, fair, non-discriminatory and they to 
do set incentives to place, modify or cancel orders that can cause disorder into trading or market 
abuse. These fees are adjusted by regulated market considering if the orders got cancelled, if an 
order is placed and in a second moment is cancelled, if the participants place a high ratio of 
cancelled orders or if they do high-frequency trading technique in order to reflect the additional 
burden on system capacity222.  
The algorithms produce orders that have to be recognized by the regulated market, 
moreover, the market shall be able to discover which algorithms are used to create the orders. 
Additionally, competent authorities must be allowed by the regulated market to check the order 
book. To understand deeper and better at the article 48(12) ESMA develop draft technical 
standards to specify223: what is needed by a regulated market to surely have a resilient trading 
system which is also able to adequate capacity, it also clarifies that fee structures are fair, non-
discriminatory and most important they do not boost disorderly trading conditions or market 
abuse, these technical standards also want to determine when a regulated market in liquid for a 
specific financial instrument. ESMA developing these standards wanted to specify also the 
requirements to decide and to be sure that market making224 schemes are fair and non-
discriminatory also to set the minimum market making obligations225.  
In the article 48 we saw that regulated market has to control the tick sizes, in the article 49 
the regulator says that regulated markets must use tick size regime in shares and other financial 
instruments for which are developed some technical regular standards. These tick size regimes 
are characterized by a calibration in accordance with the liquidity profile of the financial 
instrument in different markets and with the bis-ask spread. The setting of the bid-ask spread is 
done considering how much is desirable having reasonably stable prices with no unduly 
constraining further narrowing of spreads, furthermore these regimes should be able to manage 
the tick size differently for every financial instrument always in an appropriate way226.  
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ESMA again has the role to draw and develop regulatory technical standards227 in order to 
specify the minimum tick size or to have an orderly functioning market, it can draw these 
standards to specify the tick size regimes for shares or other financial instruments. Then, these 
regulatory technical standards are sent to the Commission which is empowered to adopt them 
in accordance with Regulation 1095/2010/EU228.  
Nowadays being able to trade around the world using technologies there will be trades done 
at different time because of the jet lag, at this purpose the Member States want all trading venues 
with their members and participants to synchronize their business clocks used to notify and 
report the date and the time of any important event. Regarding this requirement ESMA again 
has to develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the accuracy of the clocks’ 
synchronization on line with the international standards, then these technical standards are sent 
to the Commission which has the duty of adopting them according with Regulation 
1095/2010/EU article 10 to 14229.  
So far this first set of requirements underlined: what is needed to get the authorization to 
be considered a regulated market, what it is required for regulated market operators and for 
management bodies to operate their duties in the best way possible, which are the organizational 
requirements and how are managed the system resilience, the circuit breakers and electronic 
trading.  
The European Parliament and the Council at article 51 of MIFID II set the admission 
requirements of financial instruments to trading. The first requirement that regulated markets 
are asked to fulfil is to have transparent and clear rules about the way to allow a financial 
instrument to be traded on a regulated market, those rules have to ensure the fair, ordered and 
efficient trade of financial instrument, when there is a transferable security it has also to be 
freely negotiable. There is also the possibility to trade derivatives, in this case it’s specified by 
the article 51(2) that the way how a derivative contract is set should make easier pricing 
orderly230.  
Moreover, regarding transferable securities regulated markets are asked to have 
dispositions to check if the issuers of these transferable securities after being admitted to trading 
on regulated market is compliant with the obligations about initial, ongoing or ad hoc disclosure 
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obligations. Since this admission to regulated market can be withdrawn once that regulated 
markets gave it they are supposed to have dispositions to control that the admission 
requirements of the financial instruments admitted to trading are fulfilled. The transferable 
securities aren’t forced to be traded only on a regulated market, they can be admitted to trade 
in more than one also without the permit of the issuer but according to the Directive 
2003/71/EC.  
Clearly even if the consent of the issuer is not needed it has to be informed by the regulated 
market about his transferable security traded on another regulated market, further since he 
wasn’t aware of this admission to trading on another regulated market he is not obliged to give 
information about its compliance with the obligations under Union law231. Here again ESMA 
comes into play with its duty if drawing draft regulatory technical standards, regarding the 
admission to trading these drafts should define clearly the different characteristics of financial 
instruments considered by the regulated market when it asses with which conditions it has to 
deal. Additionally, the regulated market must make the dispositions, that want to verify that the 
issuer of the transferable security respects its obligations under Union Law, clear. Then, also in 
this case ESMA has to provide these drafts regulatory technical standards to the Commission 
which will adopt them according to Regulation 1095/2010/EU232.  
As said before the admission to trading it has to be maintained because if the requirements 
are not respected the financial instrument can be suspended or removed from trading on a 
regulated market. The market operator can suspend or remove the financial instrument from 
trading if it doesn’t respect the regulated market’s rules unless this operation of suspension or 
removal will lead to damage to the investors or to the functioning of the market. If a financial 
instrument is suspended or removed from trading the regulated market which has done it and it 
has to suspend or remove the derivatives linked with the financial instruments, the market 
operator has to publish and notify to the competent authority the decision of suspension or 
removal of the financial instrument or of any linked derivative233 if this suspension or removal 
will not cause damage to the investors and to the functioning of the market.  
Being possible that a financial instrument can be traded on other trading venues a competent 
authority, in whose jurisdiction the removal or suspension is done, can ask for the suspension 
or the removal of this financial instrument from trading on all the trading venues on which it is 
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traded if the suspension or removal is due to market abuse, inside information about the issuer 
or it’s against the Regulation 596/2014/EU. In respect of the transparency principles and rules 
the competent authority has to notify its decision to ESMA and to the other competent 
authorities, in case it decided to not suspend or remove a financial instrument from trading it 
has also to give an explanation. In the case of a suspended or removed derivative traded on 
more than one trading venues it has to be suspended or removed from trading from all the 
trading venues on which is traded. To have a fair and a proper use of the right to suspend or 
remove from trading a financial instrument ESMA is supposed to set draft regulatory technical 
standards234, another reason why these standards are done is to check if the link between a 
derivative and a suspended or removed financial instrument implies also the suspension or the 
removal of the derivative235.  
After a financial instrument is admitted to trading it still need the access to the regulated 
market. First the regulated market has to manage the access through transparent and non-
discriminatory rules, these rules have to established then implemented. These rules must set the 
path that has to be followed by members or participant of the regulated market, they set the 
administration of the regulated market, they decide the rules regarding the transactions done on 
the market and also the procedures for the clearing and settlement of transactions concluded on 
the regulated market236.  
The entities admitted as participants or members of a regulated market have to be aligned 
with the Directive 2013/36/EU in the case they are credit institutions or investment firms. 
Moreover, can get the access to regulated market only persons good repute, that have skill, 
competences and experience into trading and also persons that have enough resources to fulfil 
the duties given by the role they perform considering the different financial dispositions 
established by regulated market looking forward to guaranteeing the settlement of transactions. 
Obviously, the regulated market from other Member States is obliged to inform the home 
competent authority about its intention to access to trading in other trading venues. This 
information has to accessible to ESMA in accordance with regulation 1095/2010/EU237. 
Maintaining the access to a regulated market or a trading venue in general is not something 
obvious, to keep having this privilege the rules of the regulated market have to followed and 
respected. These are not the only rules that a regulated market has, it is required by the Member 
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States to have efficient dispositions and procedures comprehending the needed resources for 
the monitoring of the compliance by their members or participants with its rules. In order to do 
a more clear surveillance, to identify infringements of these rules or to check when conditions 
of disorder trading are presents regulated markets monitor sent orders also the cancelled 
transaction done by its member or participants under its trading system238.  
The regulated market not being the main regulator the market operators working into it 
have to notify to its competent authorities as soon as possible when rules are not respected, 
when disorderly trading is caused, and a forbidden behavior is taken in accordance with 
Regulation 596/2014/EU. This is only the first step of communication in case of issues, in fact 
the competent authorities linked with the regulated market have to inform ESMA and the 
competent authorities of other Member States, this happens only when the competent authority 
is completely sure that the forbidden behavior took place. To make this communication process 
easier the regulated market is asked from the Member States to inform on time and without 
undue delay the authority having the duties to investigate and in case prosecute market abuse 
on regulated market. Regulated market has also to completely collaborate in latter 
investigations and prosecutions of market abuse239.  
One of the main goals of MIFID II was to try to have a more “regulated” OTC derivatives 
market, to do so the CCPs were introduced as intermediaries into the OTC market. Regarding 
this the article 55 of MIFID II sets some dispositions about the connections between regulated 
markets and CCPs240. Always looking for having a clear settlement regulated markets cannot 
be forbidden to do business in a right way with a CCP and a settlement system of another 
Member States. Moreover, the competent authority of a regulated market cannot disagree about 
the use of CCP, clearing houses and settlement systems in other Member States.  
The competent authority can oppose to this use only when it is necessary do not allow this 
use to maintain the orderly functioning of that regulated market, also the competent authority 
should monitor the clearing and the settlement system241. To know which the authorized 
regulated markets are each Member State has the duty of writing a list of the regulated markets 
for which it is the home Member State and send this list and any changes to ESMA and to other 
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Member States. Further, ESMA while publishing has to keep this list update. This list has to 
contain information regulated market written in article 65 of Regulation 600/2014/EU242. 
4.4 Multilateral Trading Facility (MTF) 
The second kind of trading venue is the Multilateral Trading Facility (MTF), it was 
introduced by MIFID I and re-modelled by MIFID II. The definition of MTF is given by MIFID 
II in the article 4(1)(22), its definition is very close to the regulated market one. They are both 
defined as multilateral system that brings together multiple third-party buying and selling 
interests under non-discriminatory rules. Multilateral system is defined as a system or facility 
where third-parties can trade and interact in the system243. According to recital 7 of MIFIR 
when these interests are brought together they result in contract, moreover the same recital 
affirms that defining this system as a multilateral one should exclude bilateral system244.  
The difference between these two trading venues is that the MTF can be operated not only 
by market operator, as the regulated market, it can be operated also by an investment firm245. 
Investment firms is defined at article 4(1)(1) as any legal person having as regular business 
providing one or more investment services246 to third parties and performing investment 
activities on a professional basis. Further, it can be included into the definition of investment 
firm also the no legal persons if their legal status provides the same level of protection as a legal 
person for thirds parties interests additionally this no legal person has to be subjected to the 
same prudential supervision of a legal one. The last step to be considered a legal person being 
a natural one who holds third party interests is to not infringe the requirements and rules 
imposed by MIFID II, MIFIR and Directive 2013/36/EU and to respect some conditions 
reported in the article 4(1)(1) of MIFID II.  
As we saw for market operator into regulated markets also investment firms to operate a 
MTF need an authorization which has to be given by the Member State competent authority. 
Following the transparency principle and to help the regulators to have a better picture of the 
market all the investment firms have to be registered by the Member States, this register has to 
be public and easy to be reached, the information that it contains should be about the services 
and the activities for which the investment firm is authorized. ESMA has to be notified and 
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updated about this list also it has to publish this list around the Union specifying the services 
and the activities linked with each investment firm247.  
To be able to get the authorization the investment firm which is a legal person must have 
its head quarter and its registered office in the same Member States, on the other hand if the 
investment firm is not a legal a person or it’s a legal person that doesn’t have registered office 
under the national law, they are required to have their head quarter in the Member State where 
they do their business. The authorization in needed to clarify and specify what the investment 
firm is authorized to do, and also when investment firms, that want to expand their sample of 
services and activities provided. If these services weren’t foreseen when the authorization was 
asked the first time. This authorization has the advantage of being valid around the whole Union 
and it allows the investment firms to provide services and activities for which it was 
authorized248.  
Clearly, the request for authorization can be granted or refused, to be granted the applicant 
must respect and satisfy all the requirements needed until that time the request will be refused. 
Investment firms to satisfy the competent authority regarding the requirement for the 
authorization it has to notify the information comprehending the operations, the types of 
business and the organizational structure249. After the request for the authorization is sent the 
applicant should receive an answer within six months. In this case ESMA again has to draft 
regulatory technical standards to underline the information needed by the competent authorities, 
the requirements for the manager of investment firms and the requirements for the shareholders 
and members with qualifying holdings250.  
Obviously, this authorization can be withdrawn by the competent authority in different 
cases251 i.e. the authorization is not used within 12 months, the investment firm renounces to it, 
the authorization is got through illegal procedures, the dispositions from the MIFID II and 
MIFIR are not respected by the investment firms, every withdrawal of authorization must be 
notified to ESMA. To keep the authorization not only the investment firm has to respect some 
requirements but also its management body, it must hold a non-executive directorship then it 
has to notify to ESMA regarding the authorization obtained. 
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In this case not only ESMA has the duty of collecting information also EBA has to do it in 
accordance with the Directive 2013/36/EU. This management body is required by the Member 
States to be able for implementing the governance disposition settled to have an effective and 
a cautious management of the investment firm also to prevent conflicts of interest. These 
arrangements are helpful for the management body in order to define, accept and oversee: the 
way in which the investment firm in organized in providing investment services, activities and 
ancillary services, further it has to approve a policy according with the risk tolerance of the firm 
and the characteristics and the needs of its clients, moreover remuneration policy of persons 
providing services to third parties to push them doing a responsible business252. To maintain 
the authorization received the management body must control and assess whether the adequacy 
and implemented strategy address any deficiencies.  
Management body of investment firms to be authorized by the competent authority has to 
have a good reputation, needs to have enough knowledge, skills and experience. Additionally, 
the management body members have to notified to the competent authority by the investment 
firms in which the belong253.  As affirmed by the article 10 of MIFID II the competent 
authorities do not grant the authorization to investment firms to do business if their members’ 
identity is not notified to the authorities and if the authorities are not satisfied by the suitability 
of the shareholders254.  
A characteristic of the investment firms is that they have different shareholders and they 
can propose acquisition to increase their share into the firm, because of this possibility the 
European Council wanted to try to regulate this proposes. At this regard every natural or legal 
person, who wants to acquire or increase a qualifying holding into an investment firm, has to 
notify to the competent authority its intention and the size of the intended holding. The 
competent authority has to be aware also if a natural or legal person wants to reduce its 
qualifying holdings and the size of the reduction255.  
To make the job easier the competent authorities cooperate providing without delay the 
fundamental information for the dispositions. Furthermore, it is asked to the investment firms 
to report to competent authority if a disposition of holding in tis capital will cause holdings 
above or under a certain threshold256. Between the date of the propose for acquisition and the 
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conclusion of the deal there is a period called assessment period. During these days the 
competent authority can ask further information due to complete the assessment.  
At this point there are two possible scenarios, one where the competent authority opposes 
itself to the proposed acquisition and other one when the competent authority does not oppose 
itself to the acquisition. In the first scenario the competent authority has the duty, within 2 days, 
to notify to the proposed acquirer that it denied its propose of acquisition and it needs to say the 
reason why of its decision. In the second scenario the competent authority not being against the 
propose of acquisition shall be deemed to be approved. In order to avoid misdone propose of 
acquisition ESMA develops and writes draft regulatory technical standards to fix an exhaustive 
list of information to be put into the propose for acquisition257.  
Respecting always the main principle of MIFID II, best execution of clients’ orders, the 
competent authority assessing the notification and the information received from the proposes 
acquirer wants to guarantee the sound and prudent management of the investment firm also it 
wants to check the suitability of the proposed acquirer. To do so the competent authority shall 
control and verify the reputation of the proposed acquirer, the experience of the directors of the 
business of the investment firm once the acquisition is concluded, the financial soundness of 
the proposed acquirer and whether the investment firm is able to fulfil and respect the prudential 
requirements258. To avoid the wrong assessment Member States, publish a list with the 
information required to carry out the assessment and which information have to be provided to 
the competent authorities.  
For being an investment firm, obligations are required, these obligations have to be met 
relating to a structured deposit issued by a credit institution according to Directive 
2014/49/EU259. The authorization cannot be granted by the competent authority if the 
investment firms do not have enough initial capital according with Regulation 573/2013/EU. 
An investment firm to respect the laws and fulfil the requirements is asked by the home Member 
State to comply with some organizational requirements. According to the obligations set into 
this Directive, investment firm must set policies and dispositions to guarantee that the firm, its 
management body and its employees tied with thee obligations.  
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The firm has to have and keep an efficient organization and administrative dispositions, as 
a result of this it is forced to check and control on a regular basis financial instruments it offers 
or markets focusing on the possibility that they can affect the risk to the identified market. 
Moreover, investment firm which manufactures financial instruments has to publish and make 
available all the possible needed information regarding these instruments260. An investment 
firm to keep doing business on trading venues has to provide services and to do activities on a 
continuous and regular basis, at this regard it should use appropriate and proportionate system, 
resources and procedures.  
These procedures have to sound administrative and accounting and effective for risk 
assessment.  A prudent behavior from the investment firm has to be kept also when relying on 
a third party for performances of operational functions. Competent authorities’ supervisory role 
being not easy it can be simplified by the investment firms with the arrangement for records 
regarding all services, activities and transaction done by it261. 
 For the safeguard of the client, one of the main principle of MIFID II, in the case that an 
investment firm holds clients’ financial instruments it has to do dispositions to protect and 
safeguard the investments’ clients mainly when investment firm is insolvent also to stop it to 
use clients’ financial instrument on own account, the opposite can happen only when the clients 
agree with the use of their financial instruments262. The same care has to be put in when 
investment firm holds fund belonging to clients.  
Member States to set a fair level playing field in some particular cases can impose justified 
and proportionate requirements about the safeguard of clients’ assets, these requirements have 
to be notified to the Commission on time and at least two months before the date they are 
supposed to be applied263. As said before with the development of technologies the way to do 
trading changed, nowadays trades are done using algorithm. At this purpose MIFID II wants to 
regulate this new way of trading also after the flash crash and the 2008 financial crisis. 
Regarding this new willingness of the European Council in the article 17 of MIFID II it 
tried to set rules and requirements for investment firms doing algorithmic trading. If this new 
type of trading is used by an investment firm it needs to have an efficient system and risk 
controls correct for the operated business securing the resiliency and the enough capacity of the 
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trading system. In addition, the trading system are useful to avoid the erroneous sending of 
orders and the disorderly market, this system has to be used in accordance with the regulation 
596/2014/EU.no only the resiliency is required but also the continuity of the business 
dispositions to face and manage any failure of trading system264. Obviously, every investment 
firms that want to start doing algorithmic trading have to notify its decision to the competent 
authority of its home Member State and the ones of the trading venues in which the investment 
firm starts the algorithmic trading. After the home Member State’s competent authority is 
informed they required to the investment firm to give them regularly and ad-hoc a description 
of their algorithmic strategies, at any moment competent authority can ask further information 
from investment firm regarding its trading strategies and the parameters and limits to which the 
system is subject. 
 In order to respect the transparency principle investment firms that start high-frequency 
algorithmic trading should collect appropriately the time at which an order is placed, the 
quotations on trading venues, this information must be available to the competent authority. 
This previous information plus investment firm’s algorithmic strategies and parameters to 
which it’s subjected are registered in records to ensure that the competent authorities can 
monitor according with the requirements of MIFID II 265. Investment firms have to consider, 
when they want to follow a market making strategy, the characteristics of the market and the 
ones of the instrument traded. They should prosecute on a continuous basis during the trading 
venues’ trading hours their market making strategy to provide liquidity regularly and on a 
foreseeable basis to the trading venues. Then investment firm should sign a written agreement 
with the trading venue that has to specify the investment firm’s obligations.  
Algorithmic trading is just one of the electronic access266 to a trading venue, if the 
investment firm give direct electronic access to a trading venue it should have systems and 
controls to enhance the appropriateness of the dispositions and to reassess the suitability of 
clients who are excluded from exceeding pre-set trading and credit threshold. These controls 
have to be aligned with regulation 596/2014/EU, direct electronic access without these controls 
is forbidden. The direct electronic access in a service that has to comply with the requirements 
of MIFID II and the rules of the trading venue where its access is granted. They make sure the 
respect of the obligations coming from the service the investment firm has to make a written 
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agreement with the clients. Once that direct electronic access is provided the investment firm 
providing it has to make the competent authorities aware267.  
Investment firm can also act as general clearing member for third parties, for doing do it 
must have systems and controls guaranteeing clearing services applied to persons suitable to 
follow the clearing criteria. Moreover, investment firm has to guarantee a written agreement 
between parties. As usual ESMA comes into playing developing draft regulatory technical 
standards. These standards want to specify: the details of organizational requirements imposed 
to an investment firm which provides various activities, investment services and ancillary ones, 
they specify also when an investment firm should be forced to enter into a market making 
agreement268.  
The market operators and the investment firms operating MTFs have to respect rules and 
meeting requirements like transparent rules and dispositions for the fair trading. Moreover, 
dispositions for sound management of the operations with also the setting of contingency 
arrangements to cope with risk are needed. The above-mentioned transparent rules are about 
determination of financial instruments can be traded on a specific MTF, on the line of the 
transparency principles the market operator and the investment firms operating a MTF have to 
publish information allowing them to judge investment considering the nature of the users and 
the kinds of instruments traded269. These rules need to follow some steps during their process, 
they need to be established, published, maintained then implemented also as thy are transparent 
and non-discriminatory, they are based on objective criteria that manages the access to its 
facility.  
Operators of MTFs are required by the Member States to set arrangements to recognize and 
manage the consequences due to the operations of the MTF, of the users and participants. They 
are also required to manage conflict of interests between parties inside the MTF. Members or 
participants of MTFs have to be informed by the investment firms and market operators 
operating MTF, under recommendation of Member States, of their responsibilities due 
transactions executed in that trading venue, to have an easier settlement of these transactions 
investment firms and market operators should do some necessary arrangements270.MTFs should 
have minimum three members or users with the opportunity to actively interact with each other 
respecting the price formation. In some case transferable securities are admitted to trading on 
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MTFs without the agreement of the issuer if this happens he doesn’t need to follow the 
obligations about the financial disclosure.  
Competent authorities shall receive from investment firms and market operators of MTFs 
a precise description of the MTFs’ working comprehending possible links with other trading 
venues or systematic internaliser owned by the same market operator or investment firm. All 
this information has to be notified to ESMA which has the duty of developing draft 
implementing technical standards271. 
 European Parliament at article 19 of MIFID II sets specific requirements for MTFs and 
their operators. Investment firms and market operators running an MTF are asked to enhance 
non-discretionary rules for the execution of orders in the system. The MTFs’ operators must be 
resilient, and they should be able to identify the risks of the operations and to set up measures 
to reduce these risks. Moreover, they are required to have from the time of the authorization 
enough financial resources to make easier the functioning272. Investment firms and market 
operators operating MTFs have to monitor the orders sent, also the cancelled ones to find easier 
some breaches into these rules it’s considered the regulation 596/2014/EU.  
In the case these rules are not respected the MTFs’ operators have to notify them to the 
competent authorities, they need to receive the information without delays273. The presence on 
trading for a financial instrument doesn’t last forever, it can happen when investment firms or 
market operators suspend or remove a financial instrument from trading because it doesn’t 
respect anymore the MTF’s rules. The only case when this doesn’t lead to the suspension or the 
removal from trading is when this can lead to significant damage for the investors’ interests. 
When a financial instrument is suspended or removed from trading the derivatives referred 
to it have to be also suspended or removed by the investment firm or market operators running 
MTFs, this decision has to be made public and communicated to competent authority which 
has to notify everything to the ESMA and to the other competent authorities comprehending an 
explanation of the decision. ESMA as usual is supposed to develop draft implementing 
technical standards in order to define the type and the timing of the communications, these 
drafts then have to be sent to the Commission which is empowered to adopt delegated acts 
according with MIFID II274. 
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4.5 Organised Trading Facility (OTF) 
The directive 2014/65/EU (MIFID II) introduced another kind of trading venue to have 
more transparent and efficient financial markets and to try to follow the guidelines set by the 
G20 which wanted to move the trades of standardized OTC derivatives contracts to exchanges 
or electronic platform275, this desire came after the 2008 financial crisis because the world 
leaders wanted to have a regulation for as much as possible transactions of financial 
instruments276.  
The new type of trading venue is the organized trading facility (OTF). This OTF replaced 
as third type of trading venues the systematic internalisers introduced with MIFID I. It is defined 
at article 4(1)(23) as a multilateral system different from a regulated market and a MTF where 
different third-party buys and sells interests in bonds, structured finance products, emission 
allowances or derivatives. Moreover, these parties are able to interact in the system giving as 
result in a contract277.  
As the recital 8 of MIFIR reports of the OTC is given a broadly definition such that in the 
future all the different organized execution and the arrangement of trades that are not aligned 
with the existing venues are going to be captured into OTFs278. Another reason for this “light” 
definition is because the European Union wanted that the trading of standardized OTC contracts 
would go into the definition of OTFs. In this kind of trading venues are included broker crossing 
system and systems eligible for trading clearing-eligible and sufficiently liquid derivatives279. 
Additionally, the same recital clearly affirms that OTFs do not comprehend facilities in which 
there is no a clear trade execution or arranging taking place in system i.e. putting together 
potential buying and selling interests or portfolio compression280 that reduces non-market risks 
in derivatives portfolio with no changes in the market risk of portfolios.  
Analyzing in a deeper way the definition of OTF we saw that the action of buying and 
selling financial instruments of the third-party results in a contract to buy or sell bonds, 
structured finance products, emission allowances and derivatives, through these words we can 
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understand that therefore only non-equity instruments are traded on OTFs. This leads to a fail 
regarding the regulation of every trading system in financial instrument281.  
A huge difference between the OTFs and the other two types of trading venues is that for 
these last two are applied non-discretionary rules executing the transactions, on the hand the 
OTFs’ operator executes order on a discretionary basis. The discretion can be applied at two 
different moments, when it has to be decided if place an order on the OTF or to retract it or  
when the operator has to decide to not match a precise order with the available orders in the 
system at that moment282. Giving OTF’s nature some ways of doing transactions are forbidden, 
at this regard the combination of internalization or systematic internalization with OTFs are 
forbidden. This prohibition is due to fact that trades on OTFs are done accordingly with 
discretionary rules therefore the OTFs’ operator is able to manipulate the execution of orders, 
doing this the risk of conflicts of interests between investors and OTF’s operator increased 
exponentially.  
Being a type of trading venue OTF to do business needs the approve of competent 
authorities which monitor on a continuous basis the firms and their activities. These firms are 
very politically and economically important, because of this the regulators’ work is focused on 
granting financial stability, risk management, business plan and they want that requirements set 
for managers and shareholders are fit and proper283. To regulate the operation of an OTF, being 
the advisory to clients and trade on their behalf the core business of investment firms, alongside 
with trading facility284, it’s fundamental to be sure that the investment firms will act fairly, 
honestly, professionally, in the best interests of the clients and moreover the clients need to be 
provided with proper and useful information to allow them to set the risks of the investment285. 
Investment firms provide different services, regarding this the regulation and the 
conduction of an OTF can be viewed as ancillary services and because of that they can be 
affected from the relationship between the principal and the agent and from the best execution 
principle286.  
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With the introduction on MIFID II and MIFIR the European Parliament sets the obligation 
for investment firms and market operator running a trading venue to have reports regarding 
transaction of financial instruments and notify them to the competent authorities. Investment 
firm mainly must have available for the competent authorities for at least 5 years this 
information about all the orders and transactions done by them, if these operations are done on 
behalf of the client the information must be about the clients287, the notification has to be done 
as quickly as possible and no later than the close of the following working day.  
The competent authority plays a key role for the transmission and the spread of the 
information because it has to assure that the competent authority of the most relevant market 
regarding the liquidity for financial instruments also receives the information288. The financial 
instruments admitted to trading on OTFs are obliged to notify to the competent authorities the 
information regarding the data for the identification with the aim of transaction reporting. Even 
in this case ESMA will develop draft regulatory technical standards to keep away unnecessary 
administrative pressure on investment firms289. Moreover, ESMA have to send a report to the 
Commission regarding the characteristics of the transactions report received and exchanged 
among competent authorities able to monitor investment firms’ activities.  
A peculiarity of OTFs, as for MTFs, is that they can be operated not only by market operator 
but also by investment firms. These investment firms must follow some requirements which 
are the same as the ones followed by investment firms operating MTFs290. In order to finalize 
transactions, the operators of the OTF are required by the Member States to set rules in 
accordance with the transparency principle respecting the criteria for the determination of 
financial instruments able to be traded under its system, disposition to guarantee a fair and order 
trading also to define objective criteria for the efficient execution orders. Furthermore, these 
operators should own arrangements for the sound management of operations of the facility, 
always in line with the transparency principle the OTFs’ operators should give enough public 
information to allow their users to make their own investment thought basing on their nature 
and the kind of instruments traded291.  
Clearly the thoughts and the ideas regarding the investment made by the clients are not 
enough to consider the best execution principle respected, in fact the users and participants of 
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OTFs have to be informed by investment firms and market operators running the trading venue 
of their responsibilities due to the execution on the transactions in that facility. Investment firms 
and market operator running OTFs have to make the dispositions needed to make the settlement 
of closed transactions easier. The operators of the OTFs have to be at least three with the 
possibility and opportunity of interacting between each other respecting the price formation. 
Even if MIFID II re-introduced in a certain way the concentration rule this doesn’t forbid 
to a transferable security to be traded on a regulated market and also on an OTF, if this happens 
without the approval of the issuer it will not be subject to any obligation about the financial 
disclosure regarding that OTF292. Market operators and investment firms running OTFs shall, 
according with Member States’ dispositions, provide to the competent authority a precise 
description of the functioning of the OTF including also any connections with or participations 
by one of the three types of trading venues or a systematic internaliser owned by the same 
investment firms or market operator and not less important a list of their participants or users. 
Then the competent authorities that received this information have to send them to ESMA on 
request. ESMA must make an updated list of OTFs in the union, it contains also the services 
provided by OTFs, further ESMA has to develop draft regulatory technical standards to define 
the format of the information transmitted293.  
In OTFs differently from regulated markets and MTFs the investment firms and market 
operators run the facility on a discretionary basis, because of this characteristic the operator of 
OTFs are supposed to organize disposition to avoid the execution of clients orders in an OTF 
versus the proprietary capital of the operators running the OTF or from any entity that belongs 
to the same group or legal person as the investment firm or market operator. The OTFs’ 
operators received the permission from Member States to engage in matched principal 
trading294 in bonds, structured finance products, emission allowances and some derivatives the 
ones where the client has consented to the process, there is a limit to the use of the matched 
principal trading. The limit is put in the case when investment firm and market operator running 
an OTF want to use matched principal trading to execute the orders of the client in an OTF in 
derivatives belonging to a class of derivatives subject to clearing obligation according to 
Regulation 648/2012/EU.  
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In case are traded sovereign debt instrument without a liquid market295 the investment firms 
and market operators running OTFs are allowed from Member States to engage deals on own 
account instead of matched principal trading296. OTFs replaced systematic internalisers as 
trading venues’ components thanks to MIFID II, systematic internalisers are now considered as 
over the counter, for this reason the operations of these two type facilities, under order of 
Member States, are not allowed to be done within the same legal entity. Additionally, OTFs 
shouldn’t be in touch with a systematic internaliser in a way resulting that OTF’s orders and 
orders or quotes of systematic internaliser interact.  
On the other hand, two different investment firms or market operators making business on 
different OTFs can engage to carry out market making on the other OTF on an independent 
basis. As said before the orders on OTFs are executed on a discretionary basis, however the 
operators of OTF may exercise discretion in few cases, when they decide to do an order or 
modify one on the OTF they operate or when decide to do not match a precise order of the client 
with other orders in the system at given time297.  
To avoid to the investment firms and market operators to benefit from the authorization for 
the operation on an OTF or on ad-hoc basis, the competent authorities shall ask for a exhaustive 
description of the reason why that system cannot be or is not like a regulated market, a MTF or 
a systematic internaliser, a deep explanation of the use of discretion focusing on how an order 
to the OTF would be retracted and the case and in which way clients’ orders will be matched 
within the OTF. The OTFs’ operators then will explain to the competent authorities, through 
notification, their use of matched principal trading. Competent authority should check that the 
engagement into matched principal trading is done respecting the definition and that it doesn’t 
lead to conflict of interest between the operators and their clients298.  
The European Council to have a stricter surveillance on the OTF, through the Member 
States, imposed to the investment firms and market operator running an OTF to set and keep 
efficient dispositions and procedures to monitor the compliance of its members or participants 
with its rules. Moreover, the operators of OTF have to control also the orders sent, the orders 
cancelled, and the transactions made by their participants under their system to recognize 
infringements of those rules299. When those rules are not respected, or Regulation 
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596/2014/EU300 arrangements are infringed the investment firms and market operators running 
an OTF have to notify their competent authorities as quick as possible regarding these 
irregularities. Then, the competent authorities will have the duty of inform the ESMA and the 
other competent authority regarding what it is happening.  
The information required by the competent authorities have to be provided by the market 
operators and the investment firms operating an OTF on time, allowing them to investigate and 
in case prosecute market abuse also to provide assistance for further investigations and 
prosecutions happening on or through its systems301.  
The financial instruments admitted to trading on OTFs, as the ones admitted to trading on 
the other two types of trading venues, can be suspended or removed from trading on OTFs. 
These instruments traded on OTFs can be removed or suspended from trading by the operators 
of the OTFs if they do not comply anymore with the OTFs’ rules except when this suspension 
or removal will lead to a damage for the clients’ interests. Having this “power” of suspension 
or removal by the operators of the OTF shouldn’t go against the right of the competent authority 
to demand for the suspension or removal of these financial instruments302. The derivatives of 
the financial instruments, suspended or removed, have to be suspended or removed from trading 
on OTFs by the investment firms or market operators running the OTFs under request of 
Member States. This decision of removing or suspending the financial instruments and any 
linked derivatives has to be publicly published and the fact has to be notified to their competent 
authority. This competent authority wants that the other OTFs under its jurisdiction, trading the 
financial instrument or derivatives which are suspended or removed from trading, also suspend 
or remove that financial instruments or derivatives from trading where this suspension or 
removal cause the suspect of market abuse or a take-over bid.  
As reported in the article 1 of delegated regulation 569/2017/EU the operators running an 
OTF can suspend a derivative according with section C of MIFID II. This derivative has to be 
linked only with one financial instrument which has been suspended or removed from 
trading303. This action of removing or suspending financial instruments and the linked 
derivatives from trading by the all trading venues on which they are traded can be suspended if 
in doing this the clients’ interests will be damaged304. The choice of the competent authority of 
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requiring the suspension from other trading venues of the financial instruments and the 
derivatives linked to them has to be made public and notified immediately or at latest 
immediately thereafter the publication of the communication to ESMA and to the other 
competent authorities of the other Member States. The notifications have to follow a timing and 
a format305 at this regard the ESMA has the duty to develop draft implementing technical 
standards, these standards has to be sent to the Commission which is empowered to behave 
according with the article 89 of Directive 2014/65/EU. 
4.6 Trading Venues Recap 
Thanks to the Directive 2014/65/EU the concept of trading venues has been changed, there 
are now three different types of trading the regulated market306, the multilateral facility 
(MTF)307 and the organized trading facility (OTF)308. 
 All of them are multilateral system, where multiple third-party brings together buying and 
selling interests leading to a contract. Being a multilateral system characterizes the trading 
venues because on the other side the systematic internalisers, that with MIFID II are no more a 
type of trading venue, are bilateral systems. Regulated markets, differently from MTFs and 
OTFs, have official recognition also they are used almost within all the countries. In contrast 
MTFs and OTFs are European entities centered on European countries. 
Regulated markets are operated only by market operators while on the other hand MTFs 
and OTFs can also be operated by investment firms, after obtaining the authorization, and 
market operators. Obviously, the investment firms are subject to different requirements (article 
5-20 Directive 2014/65/EU). Even if they can be operated by different entities, these have to 
follow the same requirements regarding information to give to the clients following the 
transparency principle, they also have to fulfil the same pre and post-trade transparency 
requirements. Then, they have to operate following the best execution principle without 
producing damage to the clients’ interests. Regulated markets, differently from MTFs and 
OTFs, need an authorization not only to provide their services but also to exist309. 
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There is also a difference between the requirements for the operators of MTFs and the ones 
of OTFs i.e. the MTFs’ operators need to have dispositions to manage the risks at which they 
are exposed. 
The main differences between the last approved type of trading venue and the other two are 
that regulated markets and MTFs are operated on a non-discretionary basis while the OTFs are 
operated with discretion, because of this they cannot deal on own account apart when they 
operate on the sovereign debt. The discretion above mentioned can be exercised in some cases. 
Additionally, a particularity of the OTFs’ operators is that they are required to satisfy investor 
protection obligation regarding the information for the clients, the suitability requirement and 
the best execution principle, this happens because of the discretion granted to OTFs operators.     
Then OTFs allow the access to trading to a wide variety of investors, allowing the transactions 
also to retail clients310 this is linked with a “neutrality” of the operator of the OTF regarding the 
access of investment firms admitted to trading that it has to be limited in order to avoid the 
infringement of the multilateralism311. 
Even if the concept of what is traded on a trading venue (TOTV) is not completely clarified 
by ESMA312, we can find differences between the three types of trading venues, at this regard 
the last main difference is about the type of instruments that can be traded on the types of trading 
venues, on the regulated markets and MTFs all the financial instruments can be traded while on 
the OTFs are allowed to be traded only non-equity instruments.     
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As the definition of OTF reports under this system the interests of buying and selling are about 
bonds, structured finance products, emission allowances or derivatives. Even if as we said 
before the operators of the trading venues have to follow the same pre and post-trade 
transparency rules, being the financial instruments traded on the trading venues different the 
transparency principles to be applied to equity and non-equity instruments are different313.  
4.7 Overview on Systematic Internaliser (SI) and Over The Counter (OTC) 
Not all the transactions are done on the exchange and regulated markets, most of them 
are done out of the trading venues. MIFID II, trying to give a regulation to the transactions 
done outside the exchange, redefined the concept of trading venues and consequently the 
composition of the over-the-counter segment.  
 4.7.1 Systematic internaliser (SI)      
With the introduction of the Directive 2014/65/EU the systematic internalisers lost their 
“position” in the category of trading venue, being replaced by the OTFs. The SIs are defined 
by the article 4(1)(20) of the Directive 2014/65/EU314. The difference with the definitions of 
the three kinds of trading venue is that the systematic internalisers are not defined as a 
multilateral system, a systematic internaliser is defined as an investment firm which deals on 
own account through the execution of clients’ orders not on a trading venue.  
Dealing on own account by an investment firm that is a systematic internaliser has to be 
done on an organized, frequent systematic and substantial basis. Investment firms being a 
systematic internaliser, following the transparency principle, has to publish firm quotes 
regarding shares, depositary receipts, ETFs, certificates and other similar financial instruments 
traded on trading venues, these financial instruments must have a liquid market315.  
The quotes that a systematic internaliser is obliged to publish have a minimum size 
which has to be at least the 10% of the standard market size of share, ETF, certificate or share 
traded on a trading venue. These instruments are divided by classes according to the competent 
authorities of the most important market regarding the liquidity, then these divisions have to 
notified to ESMA that develop draft regulatory technical standards to have an efficient and 
correct valuation of these financial instruments316. Systematic internalisers’ quotes must be 
published by them with regularity and continuously during the trading hours, the investment 
firms that fulfil the definition of systematic internaliser have to notify this to their competent 
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authority that will make ESMA aware which will write down a list of SIs in the Union. From 
the definition of systematic internaliser we now that they execute clients’ orders, this execution 
can be done differently depending on the type of the client. If a client is defined as professional 
the execution of the orders can happen at a different price without follow the requirements set 
by article 27 MIFID II, the other case is when the systematic internalisers execute the orders at 
the quoted prices because of the requirements set by article 27 Directive 2014/65/EU317.  
The Regulation 600/2014/EU also set obligations for the competent authorities, they 
have to check if the investment firms update on a regular basis the bid and offer prices 
published, moreover they have the duty of controlling that investment firms respect the 
requirements for price improvement318. The systematic internalisers have the possibility to 
choose, considering their policies and through a non-discriminatory way, to who give access to 
their quotes, then they can always refuse to start a discontinuous business relationship with 
clients with credit status and risk not very convenient for them. Then, another advantage of 
being able to choose to who allow the access to the systematic internalisers’ quotes is that they 
can decide on a non-discriminatory way their number of transactions with the same client to 
reduce their risk exposure319.  
A main pillar of MIFID II is the transparency principle, according to this investment 
firms, that respect the definitions of systematic internaliser, have to publish their quotes respect 
to bonds, emission allowances, structured finance products and derivatives traded on a trading 
venue which are required to have a liquid market, the publication happens when firms provide 
their quotes320. The quotes published have to be available also to the other clients after having 
received the access to them. Investment firms defined as systematic internalisers have to 
mandatory respect post-trade requirements.  
When investments firms execute a transaction, on own account or on behalf of the client, 
in share, bonds, ETFs, derivatives, depositary receipts and similar financial instruments traded 
on a trading venue are forced to publish the price, the volume and the time of the transactions. 
Competent authorities have the possibility to let the investment firms to publish later, or to 
publish just part of the information and the details of the transactions during the period of the 
deferral publication, during an extended period of deferral the investment firm can omit the 
publication of the volume of transactions. Then, ESMA which has received this information is 
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required to develop draft regulatory technical standards to underline the identifiers for the 
different types of transactions, additionally these standards have to be submitted to the 
Commission321. 
4.7.2 Over the Counter (OTC)   
      After the meeting G-20 in Pittsburgh the regulators identified the weakness of the 
transactions done outside the exchange on the so-called over-the-counter, the European 
Commission wanted to try to regulate as much as possible the OTC derivatives market, which 
is generally divided in five branches i.e. foreign exchange derivatives and interest rate 
derivatives, introducing the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) (Regulation 
648/2012/EU). 
EMIR was introduced in order to reduce systemic risk, enhance transparency in the OTC 
derivatives market and maintain financial stability. To reach its goal the Regulation puts in 
order rules about OTC derivative contracts, central counterparties (CCPs), which entered into 
force in 2015, and trade repositories322. A certain level of regulation seemed to be needed for 
the OTC derivatives because as recital 4 of Regulation 648/2012/EU says the OTC 
derivatives323 lack of transparency being negotiated privately and so any information is 
available only to the parties of the contract, moreover they lead to a complex connection which 
lead to a misidentification on the level and the nature of the risks involved324.  
The key point of this Regulation is the introduction of the so-called CCPs. In many 
jurisdictions central clearings are mandatory for most standardized derivatives, obviously 
clearing leads to costs because CCPs require margin325 to be published. Their role is to clear all 
the standardized OTC derivatives contracts that after have to be reported to trade repositories. 
In doing so they want to reduce the counterparty risks, the CCPs go alongside with some 
requirements introduced by draft technical standards. These standards want to ensure the 
reduction of counterparty risks through the definition of the framework for the application of 
the clearing obligation, they also specify the risk mitigation technique for OTC derivatives non-
centrally cleared326.  
CCPs, previous authorization from the competent authority, have the duty to clear OTC 
derivatives contracts referred to a class of OTC derivatives subject to clearing obligation 
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according with ESMA having the role of deciding which class of OTC derivatives is subject to 
clearing obligation. The be declared subject to the clearing obligation those contracts have to 
respect some parameters, they have to be concluded in a certain way i.e. between two financial 
counterparties, or they are entered into or novated on or after the date from which the clearing 
obligation takes place327. The CCPs have to respect the clearing obligation on a non-
discriminatory and transparent basis. Here again ESMA plays a key role developing draft 
regulatory technical standards to specify the classes of OTC derivatives subjected to the 
clearing obligation, the minimum maturity of OTC derivative contracts subject to frontloading. 
Regarding the goal on enhancing transparency is tried to be reached forcing the CCPs 
and their clearing members to publish the prices and the fees linked with the provided services, 
moreover CCP shall report separately costs and revenues of the services offered, it has to make 
public the risk associated with the service provided to the clearing members and clients. 
Additionally, CCP informed their members and clients about the price formation used to 
calculate the end-of-day exposures to its members also the volumes of the cleared transactions 
of every class on instruments cleared by the CCP328. A second step to increase the transparency 
is done with the introduction of requirements i.e. clear information regarding derivative 
contracts has to be given to trade repositories329 and made it available for the supervisory 
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authority then ESMA is responsible for the control of trade repositories and for granting and 
withdrawing the authorization330. 
5 OVERVIEW OF AMERICAN REGULATION FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS 
The financial markets obviously are not only a European business, they are also present 
in the United States of America. The regulation of these markets on the other side of the ocean 
is way different from the one in Europe. The entities empowered of the regulation of the US 
financial market are the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), which regulates the 
transactions of corporate stocks or bonds and which is a federal institution independent from 
the government. The other regulator is the called Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
which has the role of control the transactions of futures and options (CFTC). 
 
SEC has to adopt new regulations and when it’s needed change the old ones, it has a 
surveillance duty regarding the intermediary companies providing financial consultation and 
the main responsibility of the SEC is to coordinate the regulation of the American financial 
market linked also with foreign entities331. SEC was introduced as supervisor of the market with 
the aim of protect the investors, maintain a fair, orderly and efficient market and to facilitate 
capital formation. 
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In order to fulfil its duties, the SEC is split into divisions, each of them with a different 
role. One of the them is the division of trading and markets which works alongside the 
Commission trying to fulfil its responsibility of maintaining fair, orderly and efficient markets 
and nonetheless this division has to surveil the financial markets. This division controls every 
day the major market participants i.e. securities exchanges, securities firms and self-regulatory 
organisations (SROs). Moreover, also the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), 
that insures the securities and cash in the customer accounts against the failure of brokerage 
firms, is controlled by this division332.  
The SEC has to review the equity markets structure which were subject to a big 
transformation in the last years, in fact these markets are now characterized by a more 
decentralized system in which the trading activity, then the American trading venues, are 
divided along exchanges, alternative trading systems (ATS) and broker-dealers or 
internalisers333. This markets structure came out with different regulations, particularly the 
Regulation NMS which pointed out two types of competition, the one among market centers 
and the one among individual orders. These types of competition are allowed by the 
Commission but the trading centers have to execute trades at the best publicly quoted prices.  
The broker-dealer above mentioned is defined professor Robert Shiller as an 
organization hiring natural persons as brokers and dealers, these two figures act in a different 
way, the brokers follow the instruction from others as their agent and thanks to them they earn 
commissions, the dealers instead act as a principal in the transactions from where they will 
make a mark-up334 
To execute trades the brokers or dealers, as the Rule 15c3-5335 defined, with access to 
exchange or to ATS have to establish and maintain a system of risk management controls and 
supervisory procedures to reduce the financial risk of the brokers and dealers and to ensure 
compliance with all regulatory requirements. These brokers and dealers are not only required 
to have and maintain a risk management system but they also have to implement it. For the 
Commission these controls and supervisory duties have to be applied on a pre-trade basis and 
under the exclusive control of the broker or dealer in order to do not be inadequate to solve the 
risks of market access336.  
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The Rule 15c3-5 was introduced by the Commission to reduce the risks faced by the 
broker or dealer requiring to it to have an effective financial and regulatory risk management 
controls, these controls should be helpful to decrease risks linked with market access then 
increase market integrity and investor protection in the securities markets. 
Linked with the protection of the investor the Commission wrote down a possible 
interpretation regarding the standard of conduct for investment. To run an investment a broker 
or a dealer has to follow some guidelines, first being considered a fiduciary it has to act in the 
best interests of its clients, moreover it has to provide advice and services to retail investors. 
Furthermore, it has to deliver to retail investors a relationship summary that has to provide these 
investors with information about the services offered, the fees and costs scheme337.    
The equity markets, not only the American one; are always subject to changes and 
modernization, to allow the US equity markets to follow these changes the Commission adopted 
the Regulation NMS (national market system). This regulation is defined as a series of 
dispositions to remodel the equity markets after these changes. 
These dispositions where oriented to the protection of the clients’ interests with a new 
Order Protection rule, moreover this regulation introduced a new Access Rule that with a 
private linkage approach wanted to develop a fair and non-discriminatory access to quotations 
displayed by NMS trading centers. Other dispositions were the new Sub-Penny rule which 
reminds the European minimum tick size and the reorganization of existing Exchange Act rules 
to help to understand clearly the rules338. 
With the development of new technologies also the way to trade changed, nowadays a 
big share of the US equity trading is done through electronic limit order books operated by 
broker or dealers. These new trading systems not being regulated as exchange are known as 
Alternative Trading System (ATS)339.  
What is an ATS? The Commission defined an ATS as a trading system that meets the 
definition of exchange but is not required to register as a national securities exchange if it 
operates under the Exchange Act rule. ATS are SEC-regulated electronic trading system buying 
and selling interests regarding securities. Obviously an ATS has to follow some rules defined 
by the Regulation ATS, it has to register as broker-dealer and report its intention to the 
Commission before starting its operations. Moreover, as we saw in the European regulation, 
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the ATS has to notify any changes in its operations and any intentions of cessations of them340. 
Today all the ATSs are dark pools this means that they allow their users to place orders without 
publicly displaying the size and price of their orders to other participants in the dark pool, same 
characteristic belonging to the OTC users. 
In order to reinforce the markets for securities and to introduce innovative new markets 
the Commission adopted the Regulation ATS. This Regulation wanted also to give to ATS the 
possibility to choose to register as a national securities exchange or as broker-dealer. The 
number of ATSs is growing on a continuous basis, at this regard these rules want to combine 
this number into the national market system and also they want to make the registered 
exchanges more competitive with ATSs341. 
The broker-dealers can also internalize orders, which means they match orders they hold 
as agent or they take the other side of the trade as principal. Internalization is a type of dark 
liquidity this means that broker-dealers can decide to do not publish prices and quantities at 
which they are willing to internalize orders. 
Broker-dealers managing customer’s cash and securities in order to protect their clients’ 
interests have to respect different requirements. They have to respect the Net Capital rule which 
asks to broker-dealers to keep more than a dollar of highly liquid assets for each dollar of 
liabilities. Then having to protect clients’ interests broker-dealers cannot use customer 
securities and cash to finance their own business. Nonetheless they have to notify to count, 
check and verify which securities are held for customers and which for themselves342. 
We now analyze the second regulator of the American financial market the CFTC. This 
entity’s duty is to have markets that are open, transparent, competitive and financially sound, 
moreover it wants to protect the market users and their funds that are subject Commodity 
Exchange Act. This Commission also looks to reduce the risk of the futures and swaps markets 
to the economy and the public343. 
Same as the SEC also the CFTC is split in divisions each of them with a different role, 
the Clearing and Risk controls the derivatives clearing obligations and other market participants 
in the clearing process, the Enforcement division scrutinize and “punish” violations of the 
Commodity Exchange Act and regulations, the division to complete the duty of the Commission 
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is the Market Oversight one which will lead the market to be open, transparent, fair, competitive 
and safe with the control of derivatives platforms and swap data repositories344. 
To facilitate its work of supervision CFTC’s advisory committees were created, 
between them there are the global markets advisory committee (GMAC) and the market risk 
advisory one (MRAC). The global markets committee will help the Commission to avoid 
regulatory or operational difficulties to global business while still maintaining the protections 
for market participants. Furthermore, GMAC will help the Commission regarding appropriate 
standards to regulate futures, swap, options and intermediaries, in addition it will play his role 
identifying ways to enhance domestic and international regulatory structures keep allowing to 
the domestic markets and firms to be competitive globally345. On the other side the role of the 
MRAC is to notify to the Commission regarding systemic issues that affect the stability of the 
derivatives and other linked markets and the results and causes of the development of market 
structure of the derivatives and other linked markets346. 
5.1 American Trading Venues      
As already underlined most of the exchanges nowadays are done in an electronic way. 
These exchanges can be done on trading venues, in the American scenario the definition and 
the division of trading venues are different from the ones belonging to the European picture.  
The trading venues are divided according with the American regulation in three 
branches the exchange i.e. the New York one, the alternative trading system and the broker-
dealer internalization. The American regulators reach these distinctions because thanks to the 
development of the financial markets because new electronic trading venues came out. 
The choice between being one of these types of trading venues obviously leads to 
different consequences, obligations and requirements. At this regard the exchanges have market 
surveillance and regulate their members, while ATSs do not. The exchanges’ rules are required 
to meet a public interest and changes to those rules subjected to SEC approval. Any broker-
dealer has to be able to be a member of exchanges, while ATSs apply a fair access only when 
the 5% trading volume threshold is exceeded, on the other hand the broker-dealer decide to 
internalize an order or not on a discretionary basis. About the quotations broker-dealer do not 
have any obligations, ATSs can choose until when the 5% of trading volume is exceeded and 
exchanges’ ones are included in the consolidated quotation system347.     
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As we can understand the differences between one regulated entity or another is about 
the rules of internal governance providing the term of contracts between the trading venue and 
its members or customers. This choice will affect market participants’ access to quotation. 
The kinds of trading venues are characterized also by distinctive liability rules, broker-
dealers when they internalise and alongside them the ATSs follow the same liability rule as 
every other private financial institution. While the operators of exchanges have fully immunity 
from consequences due to monetary damages when they operate respecting regulations and 
functions of being a self-regulatory organization348 (SRO). 
5.1.1 Exchange 
A type of American trading venue is the exchange which is defined as on organization 
providing a market place to bring together buyers and sellers of securities acting as a stock 
exchange349. An exchange following the rules has to give a fair picture of its members and it’s 
required to have a correct administration of affairs, the fees and other charges have to be shared 
between all the participants and issuers. 
These rules are in place to avoid illegal acts, to enhance cooperation and coordination 
among individuals regulating, settling, clearing and facilitating transactions in securities, to 
have a free and open market and mainly to give protection to investors. Linked with the concept 
of a free market the rules of the exchange do not set unnecessary restrictions on competition. 
Members of exchanges cannot make transactions on own account or on the account of 
an associated person, however transactions by a dealer acting as market maker or transactions 
for the account of a natural person are allowed350. As we saw in the European regulation 
securities can be suspended or removed from trading if they can cause risks for the investors. 
The members or participants of an exchange are required to notify to the Commission 
on an annual basis information regarding the traded securities, their intentions, this notification 
are asked in order to give as much protection as possible to the investors351. 
5.1.2 Alternative Trading System (ATS) 
As the code of federal regulations points out these ATSs have to respect some 
requirements, according to the regulation these requirements are about the notification to the 
regulators of their intentions and operations, moreover they are required to provide the prices 
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and the sizes of the orders. Differently from brokers the ATSs do not charge any fees to 
members and broker-dealers having access to ATS using a national securities exchange. 
Regarding the access to an ATS it should set standards to grant the access to its system, 
which cannot be with no reason forbidden to any person, also following the transparency 
principle it is asked to keep a register with all the participants and the ones having access denied. 
Furthermore, it has to be possible to control and examine ATS’s premises, systems, records and 
cooperate with the inspectors. There is also a nominal requirement for ATS in fact it cannot 
have the word exchange into its nomination.  
5.1.3 Broker-Dealer 
The third kind of American trading venue is the so-called broker-dealer. As above 
defined the broker acts for the account of others charging with fees, the other entity is the dealer 
who acts, differently from the broker, as a principal. Brokers-Dealers to make transactions have 
to be registered to the Commission, the procedure to get the authorization starts with providing 
information regarding the brokers-dealers to the Commission which can grant the registration 
only if the request sent by the brokers-dealers respect all the requirements needed352. 
The registration can be suspended, no longer than 12 months, or revoked if the 
Commission finds that brokers-dealers do not fulfil the requirements anymore and if they 
violate the previous regulations’ obligations. Brokers-dealers are allowed to affect transactions 
only of securities traded on a national security exchange of which they are members. 
The investor has to choose the broker-dealer who will decide on which market execute 
your trade. It can be executed on an exchange or to a market maker, a firm ready to buy or sell 
a stock listed on an exchange. Moreover, the broker-dealer can decide to execute the trade on 
an OTC or he can bring your order to an ATS which will complete your transaction as quick as 
possible353. 
In order to respect the main principle of the regulation, protect the clients’ interests, the 
broker-dealer is obliged to look for the best execution for the client’s orders. To do so the 
broker-dealer periodically has to assess which “place” is better to place the order of his client. 
He should check also the possibility of price improvement. 
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5.2 Comparison between the European Regulation of Financial Markets and the 
American one  
The European regulation of financial markets has several differences respect to the 
American one. First as we know the United States has a single rule book about the regulation 
of the financial system while in Europe every country, of course respecting the community 
directive, has its own rule book i.e. Italy with the Testo unico della Finanza (TUF). 
The analysis of the differences can start from the figures of the regulators of the financial 
markets into the two continents. In Europe the regulation of the financial markets is operated 
by the ESMA, an entity located in Paris, which has the duty to control and regulated all the 
transactions, for what is possible, operated on the trading venues and systematic internalisers. 
In the United States the regulation of financial markets is divided between two federal regulator 
the SEC and the CFTC, these two Commissions share the regulation of the markets basing on 
the products that are traded, in fact the SEC has the role of regulator regarding the corporate 
stock or bonds while the CFTC regulates the transaction of futures and options. 
Another difference between the two regulations is the definition of the concept of 
trading venue. The three types of European trading venues are defined as multilateral system 
this lead to the exclusion from the regulation of the bilateral systems.  In Europe trading venues 
are defined as a regulated market, an MTF or an OTF354, this definition was subjected to 
changes thanks to the introduction of MIFID II. These kind of trading venues are differentiated 
by the operators who run them, market operators and investment firms, also for the products 
traded on them, OTFs are able to trade only non-equity instruments contrary to the other two 
types. On the other side of the ocean the concept of trading venues is slightly different. The 
three types of American trading venues aren’t defined neither as multilateral system nor as a 
bilateral one, they are constituted by exchanges, ATSs or broker-dealer. First of all the 
American trading venue are linked only with the equity market which regulated by the SEC 
while in Europe they are linked with all the financial instruments as we can see from MTFs and 
OTFs that allow the trades of derivatives on them. 
Obviously, there are also common aspects, in both the regulations the protection of the 
clients is their central point and aim. Further, the operators of the trading venues have to be 
granted with the authorization to trade, in both the scenarios this authorization can be suspended 
or revoked. Moreover, the European operators of trading venues and the American ones are 
forced to do transactions following the best execution principle, they also have to notify to their 
respective competent authorities, before starting the transactions, their intentions, their 
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participants and in case if there will be changes of the members. In addition, both the European 
and American operators of trading venues, always linked with the protection of the clients, are 
forced to respect the transparency principle that lead also to publicly notify the prices of the 
transactions.  
6 CONCLUSIONS 
 During the years European authorities have always tried to increase regulation on the 
financial markets. Before the application of the community directive every country was related 
to its own financial market regulation implying more difficulties in doing transactions. With 
the introduction of MIFID I and with its development into MIFID II the European Parliament 
and Council made a huge step forward into the financial market regulation. 
It’s useful to remind that the European Parliament and Council, trying to define a unique 
regulation for the whole financial market, decided to approve alongside MIFID II other 
regulations not leave any branch of the financial markets unregulated. These regulations are the 
MIFIR which underlines the transparency requirements for equity and non-equity instruments, 
the EMIR which is focused on trying to regulate a much as possible the OTC and in addition 
the PRIIPs regulation was introduced focused on the information provided to clients in order to 
assess the level of risk tolerance. 
Financial crisis in 2008 showed lacks in MIFID I regarding the transparency rule, 
market integrity and protection of clients. After this event the regulators started to draft MIFID 
II which wanted to fulfil lack of the previous directive. As above mentioned in detail the 
directive 2014/65/EU made some adjustments to solve these problems. It ensures that 
exchanges are executed on regulated platforms, it improves the transparency and oversight of 
financial markets-including derivatives markets and addressing some shortcomings in 
commodity derivatives markets, it limits the speculations on commodities, it introduces 
regulation on algorithm and high-frequency trading and it enhances investor protection and 
improves conduct of business rules as well as conditions for competition in the trading and 
clearing of financial instruments 
MIFID II focalizes the attention of the regulators and the operators of the market on the 
protection of the clients. To reach this goal different principles were put in order, the 
transparency principle leading to the notification of the transactions and the members of the 
trading venues and the best execution principle which forced the operators of the trading venues 
to run their transactions taking always care of the willingness of their investors.  
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Thanks to this late directive it was finally defined the concept of trading venue, divided 
into three sub-categories regulated markets, MTFs and OTFs. All of these three types of trading 
venues bring together buying and selling interests leading to a contract. Through this distinction 
the regulators wanted to specify at first which operators could trade on trading venues, i.e. 
regulated markets can only be run by market operators, and on which trading venues they are 
able to trade, basing on their characteristics. Moreover, it was specified also which financial 
instruments were traded on each trading venue i.e. non-equity instruments on the OTFs. 
Directive 2014/65/EU using the trading venue definition and resetting in a certain way the 
concentration rule also wanted to try to regulate as much as possible the transactions run on the 
OTC and to bring the higher number possible of transactions on the trading venues to have a 
safer and a more regulated financial market.  
As we said MIFID II was approved alongside other directives MIFIR and EMIR. 
Markets in financial instruments regulation was introduced to not leave breaches into the 
regulation of financial markets. This regulation set requirements about Disclosure of data on 
trading activity to the public. Disclosure of transaction data to regulators and supervisors, 
mandatory trading of derivatives on organised venues, removal of barriers between trading 
venues and providers of clearing services to ensure more competition, specific supervisory 
actions regarding financial instruments and positions in derivatives. 
European market infrastructure regulation wants to increase the transparency of the 
OTC derivatives markets. It establishes new regulatory requirements on all types and sizes of 
entities that enter into any form of derivative contract, including those not involved in financial 
services. 
The main goal of these directives, protection of the clients, best execution principle and 
adoptions of transparency rules, are the same as the American regulation. This same 
characteristic of the two regulations shows that even if the clients don’t have an active role into 
trade their interests are the center of the financial markets, this approach became more and more 
important after the crisis. 
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